

How to catch your hacker: practical stories

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How to start your investigation

Step 0: Operation Security



Use a prediction service to load pages more quickly



Type a message here










Hide IP

Disable a "prediction service"

Store and share URLs in a "safe mode"



Step 1&2: Get facts and check facts





Practical story: VT and URL's



VT shows a connection between a newhighland.rar sample and a domain ywbz.hn

ywbz.hn substring inside the newhighland.rar




When DHS/FBI "GRIZZLY STEPPE" report... goes terribly wrong





Note: Russian authorities reports can be hilarious too ©

Here are all the people you can fully trust in your investigations:






Following the footprints


Related samples search

Related samples search:

- Create a detection and check stats.
- Search in your samples library:
 - Heavily vendor dependent;
- Search on the external platforms:
 - Non-strict hashes
 - Strings
 - YARA



YARA samples search life-hacks:



- YARA search is FP friendly ©
- String search:
 - do not restrict to executables only
- Code search:
 - avoid absolute and long relative addresses

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Screenshots code hunting

0044F868: FF15AC804D00	call	GetCurrentThreadId
0044F86E: 8B4C2408	mov	ecx,[esp1[8]
0044F872: 56	push	esi
0044F873: 33C8	xor	ecx,eax
0044F875: 894C240C	mov	[esp][BOC],ecx
0044F879: FF1508804D00	call	DeleteMetaFile
0044F87F: 8BC7	mov	eax,edi
0044F881: 5F	рор	edi
0044F882: 5E	рор	esi
0044F883: 83C40C	add	esp,000
MM44F886 - C3	wetn • _^.	_^_^_^_^_

Following the footprints

Hunt for Clues

JPEG: not only EXIF

- Size does matter ©
- Upload time
- Information ON the picture



Credits: CabinCr3w ©



PE: not just a PDB Path and a Resources Locale

- Unique strings
 - Mutexes
 - Reg-keys
 - Dropped files names
- VT upload time
- VT upload name





MS office: not only "the dodgy dossier"

• PrinterSettings*.bin:

Reverse Who-is: not only email - any custom field

Reverse Whois:

domainabuse@tucows.com Q

nexuszeta1337@gmail.com Q

Domain Name: NEXUSIOTSOLUTIONS.NET Domain ID: 2133563803_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.tucows.com Registrar URL: http://tucowsdomains.com Updated Date: 2017-06-14T07:47:01Z Creation Date: 2017-06-14T07:40:55Z Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-06-14T07:40:55Z Registrar: TUCOWS, INC. Registrar IANA ID: 69 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: domainabuse@tucows.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4165350123 Domain Status: Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Name: Liam McPike Registrant Organization: Nexus IoT Solutions, LLC. Registrant Street: 20412 32nd Dr SE Registrant City: Bothell Registrant State/Province: WA Registrant Postal Code: 98012 Registrant Country: US Registrant Phone: +1.3607267966 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email: nexuszeta1337@gmail.com

```
Domain Name: ZETASTRESS.NET
Domain ID: 2066766456 DOMAIN NET-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.tucows.com
Registrar URL: http://tucowsdomains.com
Updated Date: 2016-10-16T22:58:44Z
Creation Date: 2016-10-16T22:58:437
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2017-10-16T22:58:43Z
Sponsoring Registrar: TUCOWS, INC.
Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 69
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: domainabuse@tucows.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4165350123
Domain Status: ok https://icann.org/epp#ok
Registry Registrant ID:
Registrant Name: kenny Schuchman
Registrant Organization: ZetaSec Inc.
Registrant Street: 8709 Ne Mason Dr, No. 4
Registrant City: Vancouver
Registrant State/Province: Washington
Registrant Postal Code: 98662
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.3607267966
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: kenny.windwmx79@outlook.com
Registry Admin ID:
Admin Name: kenny Schuchman
Admin Organization: ZetaSec Inc.
Admin Street: 8709 Ne Mason Dr, No. 4
```




Text: ransom notes language analysis





Text typos: Russian keyboard layout traces





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False Flags:

check twice

False Flags: GangCrab and a "sick children scam"



False Flags: web server can be exploited by multiple groups:

e was informed that only Chinese industrialists would re will be the benefit for Pakistan. Will the Chinese government had failed to apprise the committee whethe Jamaat-i-Islami, Sirajul Haq, endorsed the point of e also expressed fears of a clash of culture between rtant aspect which came to the knowledge of members o informed that Chinese banks will charge us more inter afs21\alang1025 \ltrch\fcsM \fs21\lang16393\langfe163 "http://www.justfood.pk/news/" * MERGEFORMAT \\d}) sv @}}{\sp{\sn pibFlays}{\sv 64}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0\picwgoal1440\pichgoal1440\wmetafile8\bliptag-195878 8\footery708\colsx708\endnhere\sectlinegrid360\sectde



Real Investigation: a POS malware


POS malware: PDB path

```
D:\WORK\APT\FastPOS\SAMPLES\1bb4fe3dc040daa0af0db7096c567cf6b6b55f28af94c56b5882193ccd29
    SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentUersion
                                                       ProductName %s
                                                                        Unknown OS
p?comdlg64=update&username=%s
                                   KillYourself
                                                    noupdate&ver=3
                                                                    NoUpdate
                                                                                  status log&lo
          statuslog&log=scanning-%s
                                        Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentUersion\Run
upe.exe
           Success Installation Complete.
                                             statuslog&log=GetLastError-zd
cture=%s
ng position map∕set<T> too long DEA 0‡0 P‡0 p‡0 %‡0 ¼±0 oEA
                               ∟5B 😉
                                                         ♦aA
       t$B 🖪
                                                  Ф$В ьэА
                                                                       MaA PoA laA <sup>U</sup>bA
                                 ЬэА
e
    ₹юA
                     8$B 転A
                                          июА НюА ЧьА
                                                                                 `EA <sup>y</sup>aA ¶aA
                  ♦яА
                                   РяА
         , 2B 😝
                                    #EA
                                                     --×B ♦яA
                                                                           ,×B IEA Ω×B
                                     X×B OgA
                                                          <del>U</del>nA ∟EA
```



POS malware: mutex

```
004046D9 loc_4046D9:
                                                    ; CODE XREF: _main+47fj
                                                    : dwMilliseconds
004046D9
                          push
                                  3E8h
004046DE
                          call
                                  ds:Sleep
                                                     "uniqyeidclaxemain"
004046F4
                                  offset Name
                          push
                                                    : bInitialOwner
004046E9
                          push
                                                    ; lpMutexAttributes
004046EB
                          push
004046ED
                                  ds:CreateMutexA
                          call
004046F3
                                  esi, ds:GetLastError
                          mov
00404<u>%</u>F9
                          call
                                  esi ; GetLastError
004048FB
                          CMP
                                  eax, OB7h
00404700
                                  short loc_40471D
                          jnz
00404702
                                  3 0h
                          push
                                                    ; uType
00404704
                                  offset aAlert ; "Alert"
                          push
                                  offset aAlreadyRunning; "Already running!"
00404709
                          push
0040470E
                          push
                                                    ; hWnd
00404710
                          call
                                  ds:MessageBoxA
00404716
                                                   ; int
                          push
00404718
                          call
                                   exit
```






POS malware: the time zone





POS malware: the screenshot





POS malware: the screenshot "data"

- 2560x1600
- Laptop
- PSF (Parallels)
- "Perfect Hook" project
- Time Zone: GMT-7

POS malware: Javacardos forum






POS malware: Steam profile





POS malware: pcpartpicker



I work a lot in Visual Studio and on my macbook the background i can differentiate between white and silver but on monitor the silver and white color are the same.

↑ ↓ Permalink




what is display port? i use hdmi but tried DPIN too its same thing. my monitor doesn't have drivers but i installed nvidia latest drivers from july 14, clean install. i use windows 7 64 bit on both macbook and pc. if i connect my macbook to monitor it looks wonderfull but my pc with gtx 1080 is not crisp, my eyes get tired fast: (i want my pc to look just like my macbook pro on monitor



Thank you for answer. My samsung monitor is U28E590D I tried to connect the pc to my 65" Samsung (KS9500 9-Series Curved 4K SUHD) I also tried to HP 25ES monitor with different cables. Still the text is not crisp, images are blurry, not high quality like on macbook pro

POS malware: pcpartpicker




The cooler connector has 4 pin but on my motherboard i have about 4 slots for that, does it matter where i connect them? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zBVSgn_h7iU This is the video. I'm not sure if its ok to be this loud

↑ ↓ Permalink



POS malware: YouTube profile






POS malware: YouTube Videos time and links







POS malware: Google ID



Interaction with Interpol: a researcher perspective

Interaction with Interpol: preparation




Backup all the clues



Write a comprehensive report



POS malware: investigation overview





Interview with CFC officers



CFC Interpol building in SG



Waiting...





...and more waiting...



Bingo!

During the course of its seven-year history, the Infraud Organization inflicted approximately \$2.2 billion in intended losses, and more than \$530 million in actual losses, on a wide swath of financial institutions, merchants, and private individuals, and would have continued to do so for the foreseeable future if left unchecked.

The defendants indicted for their alleged roles in the Infraud Organization's transnational racketeering conspiracy include:

- Svyatoslav Bondarenko of Ukraine;
- Amjad Ali aka "Amjad Ali Chaudary," aka "RedruMZ," aka "Amjad Chaudary," 35, of Pakistan;
- Roland Patrick N'Djimbi Tchikaya aka "Darker," aka "dark3r.cvv," 37, of France;
- · Miroslav Kovacevic aka "Goldjunge," 32, of Serbia;
- Frederick Thomas aka "Mosto," aka "1stunna," aka "Bestssn," 37, of Alabama;
- Osama Abdelhamed aka "MrShrnofr," aka "DrOsama," aka "DrOsama1," 27, of Egypt;
- Besart Hoxha aka "Pizza," 25, of Kosovo;
- Raihan Ahmed aka "Chan," aka "Cyber Hacker," aka "Mae Tony," aka "Tony," 26, of Bangladesh;
- Andrey Sergeevich Novak aka "Unicc," aka "Faaxxx," aka "Faxtrod" of the Russian Federation;
- Valerian Chiochiu aka "Onassis," aka "Flagler," aka "Socrate," aka "Eclessiastes," 28, of Moldova;
- John Doe #8 aka "Aimless88;"
- · Gennaro Fioretti aka "DannyLogort," aka "Genny Fioretti," 56, of Italy;



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Summary:

How to start your investigation Following the footprints False Flags Interaction with Interpol Investigation example

Let's Talk?

