


Reversing Internet of Things from Mobile applications

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Why reverse IoT?



Reversing Internet of Things (IoT) is difficult

Different hardware



Different OS Linux, Windows Mobile, Android, Contiki, RIOT, TinyOS, Brillo...

> Different formats ELF, BFLT...



Research e.g firmware.re So, how do we get started?

Focus first on the mobile app





Apktool, dex2jar, IDA Pro...



It's faster



First step

Real examples



Real examples



Real examples




Beam Toothbrush - Smart Glasses - Safety Alarm





Let's reverse the Android and/or iOS applications

List SQL tables



Getting table columns

```
BLX
                obic retainAutoreleasedReturnValue
MOV
                R1, #(cfstr_Firstname - 0x15362) ; "firstName"
ADD
                R1, PC ; "firstName"
MOV
                R2, #(cfstr__ - 0x1536C) ; "."
ADD
                R2, PC ; "."
MOV
                R3, #( objc msgSend ptr 0 - 0x15376)
ADD
                R3, PC ; _objc_msgSend_ptr_0
LDR
                R3, [R3]; __imp__objc_msqSend
MOV
                R9, #(selRef componentsSeparatedByString - 0x15382)
                R9, PC ; selRef_componentsSeparatedByString_
ADD
MOV
                R12, #(cfstr_First_name - 0x1538C) ; "first_name"
                R12, PC ; "first name"
ADD
STR
                R0, [SP,#0x130+var 30]
STR.W
                R12, [SP, #0x130+var_58]
```

Results: What You Learn

Insured

- insuredID: primary key
- title
- first_name
- middle_initial
- last_name
- post_name
- relation_to_policy_holder
- gender

...


Device

- deviceID: primary key
- battery_remaining
- bluetooth_id
- color_int
- firmware_revision
- hardware_revision
- ▶ initial_setup
- mac_address

...

- Methods: _OBJC_INSTANCE_METHODS
- Instance variables: _OBJC_INSTANCE_METHODS contains name and type of variables

Results: What You Learn




BLE characteristics

Results: What You Learn

UUID	Description
a8902afd-4937-4346	Boolean indicator for active brushing
267b09fd-fb8e-4bb9	Motor state
3530b2ca-94f8-4a1d	Current time
833da694-51c5-4418	Motor speed
19dc94fa-7bb3-4248	Auto-off and quadrant buzz indicators
	(2 bits)
6dac0185-e4b7-4afd	Battery level (2 bytes)
0971ed14-e929-49f9	Brush color (1 byte)
0227f1b0-ff5f-40e3	Accelerometer data (6 bytes)
ed1aa0cf-c85f-4262	Gyroscope (6 bytes)
cf0848aa-ccdb-41bf	Button state

So, what?



Why are we investigating toothbrushes?!



Come on! Attackers don't care about our teeth!!!

Why are we investigating toothbrushes?!



Come on! Attackers don't care about our teeth!!! True

Why are we investigating toothbrushes?!



Come on! Attackers don't care about our teeth!!! True but you are missing the point! Attackers care about **money**

Toothbrush attack scenario 1/4: Targeted business

You own a connected toothbrush?

Attacker knows:

- ► Name and ages of member of your family
- Likely to be wealthy high tech user
- You value your health

 \rightarrow Sell health plans + high-tech ads

Known business, more or less legal, privacy issues

\$

Toothbrush Attack Scenario 2/4: Ransomware

Ransom kids pocket money See also Candid Wüest, *Is Ransomware coming to IoT devices?*

Efficient but low revenue



Toothbrush Attack Scenario 3/4: Undeserved rewards



What can the attacker get for forged brushing rewards:

- ► Free toothpaste ;) not very attractive
- ► Insurance fraud... *more scary*

Watch for this in the future

Toothbrush Attack Scenario 4/4: Infection vector



Your toothbrush (or other IoT) infects other devices

Watch for this in the future



Toothbrush - Recon Jet Smart Glasses - Safety Alarm





A shell on the glasses

- Enable USB debugging on the glasses
- Add udev rule
- Add vendor in
 - /.android/adb_usb.ini

```
WiFi
USB Debugging 
Diagnostics
Delete AGPS Data
Sensor Type
```

```
$ adb devices
List of devices attached
291052171 device
$ adb -s 291052171 shell
shell@android:/ $
```

shell@android:/ \$ getprop ro.boot.bootloader U-Boot_1.1.4-4.4-SUN^0-dirty shell@android:/ \$ getprop ro.build.description lean_jet_sun-user 4.1.2 JZ054K 11 release-keys



The glasses are using Android 4.1.2 - Jelly Bean

Hey, what hardware is it using?



/system/board properties/soc/revision: OMAP4430 /system/lib/hw/sensors.conf:


- STM LSM9DS0 accelerometer/gyroscope/compass
- STM LPS25 pressure
- TI TMP103 temperature
- Recon Free Fall
- Avago Tech APDS9900 ambient light

System applications

```
shell@android:/system/app $ ls
...
ReconCamera.apk
ReconCompass.apk
ReconItemHost.apk
...
```

Pull them, analyze them Apktool, dex2jar, JEB, baksmali...

Data leak



Example of data

```
"component": "battery_monitor",
            "data1": "99%; 4172mV",
            "data2": "Charging USB",
            "data3": "29",
            "event_type": "BatteryMeasurement",
            "time_stamp": "1434115258015"
        },
ł
            "component": "ActivityManager",
            "data1": "com.reconinstruments.
jetconnectdevice/.ReconnectSmartphoneActivity",
            "data2": "".
            "data3": "",
            "event_type": "PauseActivity",
            "time_stamp": "1434115211239"
```

Vulnerability status

Vulnerability found

Vendor contacted Issue fixed in Recon OS 4.4 (February 2016)



Toothbrush - Smart Glasses - Meian Home Safety Alarm



There's an Android app for the alarm



- Protect your house against burglars
- Controllable by SMS

But it's not very user friendly ...

Comply to a strict SMS formatting

So, they created an **Android app** to assist

end-users

(Known?) Security issue


- In the **outbox**, the SMS contains the **password** and **phone number** of the alarm.
- You get it? You control the alarm!



Fake data, of course :D

Let's suppose you are a **wise person** and **erase the SMS** You are wise, aren't you?

With the Android app, it's worse!



Weak protection for password: we can recover alarm's phone number, password, delay, emergency phone...

Your credentials are at risk even if you erased the SMS! Without the app, **1** security issue. With the app, **2 security issues** !!!

How to reverse Internet of Things

- 1. Get the mobile application, reverse it
- 2. Then, use what you have learned to go deeper down and e.g. inspect hardware, protocols etc.

Recap' (2/2)

- We know how to communicate with the toothbrush
- We know where stars and challenges are handled

- One vulnerability found and fixed
- We know what hardware is used



- One vulnerability found, advisory published
- Don't use the app!

I'm an IoT vendor: what can I do?

DO NOT

DO

- Design security of IoT from the beginning
- Review security of mobile apps
- Help security researchers work on your devices
- Consider open sourcing some or all - of your code

Do not underestimate your device / data

It may not seem interesting to **you** but an attacker has different goals! There are viruses out there

"Okay, now I'll obfuscate my mobile code!"

That's plain **stupid** and inefficient! Security by obscurity has **never** worked Thanks to Beam Technologies for providing a free user account for testing purposes. Thanks to Recon Instruments for their responsiveness. That's how security works and improves, folks!

Thanks for your attention!



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Awesome slides? Thanks! That's LATEX