

Corporate Threats

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Risks: What you don't want to happen

- Denial of Service (DoS) attack
 - From outside, by a Botnet / Zombie network
 - From inside, on purpose or not (eg: Conficker)
- Data Theft
 - Via stolen credentials (Phishing / Social Engineering)
 - Via Trojan Horses / Bots
 - Data Gathering phase
 - Data Exfiltration phase
- Loss of Reputation
 - Top risk identified by UK companies (Aon Ltd, 2005)
 - Eg: Heartland payment system



Loss of Reputation: Heartland Breach

















Hackers breach Heartland Payment credit card system

Updated 1/23/2009 12:14 PM | Comments 9 79 | Recommend 4 81 E-mail | Save | Print | Reprints & Permissions

By Byron Acohido, USA TODAY

Heartland Payment Systems (HPY) on Tuesday disclosed that intruders hacked into the computers it uses to process 100 million payment card transactions per month for 175,000 merchants.

The Washington Post

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Payment Processor Breach May Be Largest Ever

A data breach last year at Princeton, N.J., payment processor Heartland Payment Systems may have compromised tens of millions of credit and debit card transactions, the company said today.

Heartland Data Breach Could Leave 100 Million Accounts Exposed

By Stefanie Hoffman, ChannelWeb 7:22 PM EST Wed, Jan. 21, 2009



In what could be the biggest security incident in history, Heartland Payment Systems announced on Tuesday that it was the victim of a data breach that possibly compromised more than 100 million accounts after malicious software was found in its payment processing system.

Loss of Reputation: Heartland Breach



Heartland Breach Cost Company \$12.6 Million So Far

By Kim Zetter May 7, 2009 [5:42 pm] Categories: Breaches

Heartland Payment Systems reported on Thursday that the hack it experienced last year has cost the company \$12.6 million so far. The amount includes legal costs and fines from Visa and MasterCard, who say the company was not compliant with payment card industry rules.



Network World reports that during the company's financial earnings call, Heartland executives acknowledged that the breach was a heavy financial burden that had not reached a final tally yet.



Risks: Attackers' Motivation

- Financial: Blackmail / Ransom
 - Pay or I DdoS you!
 - Holding Intellectual Property
- Competitive: Intellectual Property Theft / Industrial Spying
 - Example: the "Israeli Trojan" case
- Political
 - Example: GhostNet








E-Mail & IM

- Attachments: executable, archives AND documents
- Links
- Web Sites
 - The "Drive-By Install" attack strategy
 - "Packs" available for purchase on the underground market
 - 2008: the year of SQL injections
- Social Networks
 - Intelligence source for targeted attacks
 - Worms (eg: Koobface)
- Physical Infection Vectors
 - Laptops
 - USB Keys
 - CDs







Targeted attacks against Tibetan communities: Email infection

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Attached here is the update Human Rights Report on Tibet issued by Department of State of U.S.A on March 11, 2008.

You may also visit the site:

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Sonam Dagpo

Secretary of International Relations
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Website: http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/
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Targeted attacks against Tibetan communities: Email infection

Exploits (source ISC SANS)

CHM Help files with embedded objects;

CVE-2008-0655: Acrobat Reader PDF exploit

CVE-2006-2492, CVE-2007-3899: Word

CVE-2006-3590, CVE-2006-0009: **Powerpoint**

CVE-2008-0081: Excel

CVE-2005-0944: Microsoft Access

CVE-2006-3845: LHA files exploiting vulnerabilities in WinRAR.



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MPack v0.86 stat

Attacked hosts: (total/uniq)		
IE XP ALL	87093 - 79152	
QuickTime	37 - 34	
Win2000	3953 - 3393	
Firefox	18028 - 17796	
Opera7	25 - 25	

Traffic: (total/uniq)			
Total traff:	112525 - 102044		
Exploited:	13765 - 10705		
Loads count:	14103 - 5224		
Loader's response:	102.46% - 48.8%		
User blocking:	98		
Country blocking:	OFF		
to be for the control of the control			

Efficiency: 12.53% - 5.12%

Country	Traff	Loads	Efficiency
IT - Italy	76625	11539	15.06
ES - Spain	8042	466	5.79
US - United states	3877	133	3.43



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Key Elements to Modern Defense

You need AV, IPS, AS, WCF

Above all, you need them altogether

And most importantly, you need them working altogether

Goal: when facing a threat, be able to tackle it from different angles

=> Intelligent Redundancy



Two Examples of Enhanced Security by Intelligent Redundancy



Phishing

- Phish Letter blocked by AS
- If not, blocked by AV
- If not, Phish Site blocked by WCF

Backdoor / Bot

- Binary blocked by AV
- If not, access to C & C blocked by IPS
- If not, by WCF
- => The bot cannot "phone home"

Example of IPS antibackdoor signature (simplified)

```
F-SBID( --vuln_id 17280; --attack_id 20488; --name "Backdoor.EvilFTP"; --group backdoor; --protocol tcp; --default_action pass; --revision 2602; --severity medium; --app Other; --os Windows; --status disable; --flow from_server; --service FTP; --pattern "220- Welcome To EvilFTP :)|0d 0a|"; --data_size >100; --seq =,1,relative; )
```



